Economic Policy Making. An Introduction to Comparative Analysis by Bod, Péter Ákos

Economic Policy Making
An Introduction to Comparative Analysis

Péter Ákos BOD
Economic Policy Making
An Introduction to Comparative Analysis
Corvinus University of Budapest 
Budapest, 2019
©Péter Ákos BOD
“This book was published according to the cooperation agreement between
Corvinus University of Budapest and Magyar Nemzeti Bank.”
ISBN 978-963-503-771-1 
ISBN ISBN 978-963-503-772-8 (e-book)
Publisher: Corvinus University of  Budapest
Printed: Komáromi Printing and Publishing LTD
Leader in charge: Ferenc János Kovács executive director
Szerkesztette: Dévényi Kinga
Szerzők:	 Csicsmann László	(Bevezető)
Dévényi Kinga (Iszlám)
Farkas Mária Ildikó (Japán)
Lehoczki Bernadett (Latin-Amerika)
Matura Tamás (Kína)
Renner Zsuzsanna (India)
Sz. Bíró Zoltán (Oroszország)
Szombathy Zoltán (Afrika)
Zsinka László (Nyugat-Európa, Észak-Amerika)
Zsom Dóra (Judaizmus)
Térképek: Varga Ágnes
Tördelés: Jeney László
A	 kötetben	 szereplő	 domborzati	 térképek	 a	 Maps	
for Free (https://maps-for-free.com/) szabad 
felhasználású térképek, a többi térkép az ArcGIS for 
Desktop	 10.0	 szoftverben	 elérhető	 Shaded	 Relief	
alaptérkép felhasználásával készültek.
Lektor: Rostoványi Zsolt
ISBN 978-963-503-690-5 (nyomtatott könyv)
ISBN 978-963-503-691-2 (on-line)
Borítókép: Google Earth, 2018.
A képfelvételeket készítette: Bagi Judit, Csicsmann László, Dévényi Kinga,
Farkas	Mária	Ildikó,	Iványi	L.	Máté,	Muhammad	Hafiz,	Pór	Andrea,	Renner	Zsuzsanna,	
Sárközy	Miklós,	Szombathy	Zoltán,	Tóth	Erika.	A	szabad	felhasználású	képek	forrását	
lásd	az	egyes	illusztrációknál.	Külön	köszönet	az	MTA	Könyvtár	Keleti	Gyűjteményének	
a kéziratos oldalak felhasználásának engedélyezéséért.
Kiadó: Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem
A kötet megjelentetését és az alapjául szolgáló 
kutatást a Magyar Nemzeti Bank támogatta.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements and preface...................................................................7
CHAPTER 1: Why study comparative economic policy - making?...............11
1.1 On terminology and scope of the book.....................................................13
1.2 Yes, modern economies are open. But to what degree?
And how openness influences policy making?........................................17
1.3. As aside on free trade and comparative advantage – or: why 
 economic protectionism of Mr. Trump earned him votes 
 in capitalist USA?......................................................................................22
1.4 Economies differ. How to measure differences?.......................................26
1.5 Ideologies and political values also differ and they have...........................27
 strong impact on policy matters................................................................30
1.7 Policy mainstream and ‘best practice’......................................................35
CHAPTER 2: States and governments come in all sizes and shapes.......37
2.1 Comparative politics – we all compare but it is not easy
 to find the relevant comparator.................................................................40
2.2 National comparison as part of national competition................................41
2.3 Who needs reliable data?..........................................................................48
2.4 Information is power – bad info is a weakness ........................................53
CHAPTER 3: Government actions and inaction: why 
do we pay so much tax to the state.............................................................55
3.1 Remits and limits of governments.............................................................57
3.2 Socio-economic systems and variations...................................................60
3.3 Main contemporary market economy models – and their 
 economic policy styles..............................................................................64
3.4 A sensitive decision: choosing the currency regime.................................72
3.5 A chapter mostly closed – centrally planned economies..........................75
3.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................79
CHAPTER 4: Policies in transition countries...............................................81
4.1 There was no textbook to go by when simultaneous shocks 
 hit a disintegrating regime, and nations wanted to “return to Europe”.........83
4.2 What’s in a name?.....................................................................................84
6 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD: ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
4.3 Shock therapy or/and gradual changes....................................................92
4.4 CEE region: from exuberance to crisis – overdependence on 
 capital inflows............................................................................................94
CHAPTER 5: Economic policy in crisis: A European survey......................99
5.1 Shocks in economy, society and in policy making....................................101
5.2 Mounting global imbalances leading to financial crisis............................101
5.3 Conclusions.............................................................................................105
CHAPTER 6: Unorthodoxy is the New Normal? Economic 
Policies after the Crisis................................................................................109
6.1 When international best practice does not work efficiently......................111
6.2 Lessons to learn......................................................................................114
6.3 A new normal soon? And only a single one?..........................................117
6.4. Measures always work slightly different in European periphery.............121
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PREFACE  7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PREFACE
This book has been several years in the making. For the author, a textbook, 
or rather a book that may be used as a textbook or an item on the reading list 
for a university course, is never finished. The author would like to rewrite it eve-
ry time that she or he (the latter is the present case) opens up the manuscript. 
This urge to enrich and polish the text is not unreasonable: things change so 
fast in the world of economy, finance, and politics that what appears on the 
pages of a given volume may have been true at the time of writing but things 
might have changed by the time you accessed your own text. 
But the urge of the author has to be contained. There are important stake-
holders involved, the readers, to start with. Whether they are interested fellow 
professionals or students who are, in ideal case, similarly interested in and 
enthusiastic about the subject, readers nowadays invariably prefer accessible 
and not too long readings. Ideal cases, as we will see in various economic 
policy contexts, are imagined rather than real; similarly, readers in real life are 
mostly less enthusiastic than the author. Therefore, the text should be realisti-
cally short, and it helps if the story told in the text has some suspense. 
The good news is that economic policy events these days are full of sus-
pense. Events are a bit too fascinating, I would say. At the time of writing this 
welcoming page, decision makers and decision takers all hold their breath 
over the most recent turns of the Brexit process. Businesspeople are increas-
ingly worried about the accumulation of the distortions in international trade. 
An extremely influential and known office holder of the USA declared on Twitter 
in March 2018 that trade wars are “good and easy to win”. The US administra-
tion did soon after that introduced new tariffs on steel, aluminium, solar panels, 
and washers in order to reduce the US trade deficit. (The deficit kept growing 
after the interventions….) As historical knowledge has it: wars whether in trade 
or in killing fields are easier to start than to finish. Wars are won or lost, and 
trade wars are not at all that ease to win. Trade war between two giant players 
may spread to new sectors and regions. 
Protectionism is back. Protective measures may help certain producers and 
typically cause indirect damage to consumers, and can trigger countermeas-
ures. This newer round of protectionism in 2018 and 2019 came at a time when 
the long post-crisis economic boom in advanced economies was to end, to 
be followed by something else. The media is full of pundits’ cryptic announce-
ments about the imminent return of global recession. It may not take place 
soon, though. But what is sure is that we do live in interesting times. 
Thus this book is about a topic that must guarantee suspense for the reader. 
It has evolved from my teaching notes and course presentations to MBA class-
es at Corvinus MBA Center. Thus, my first debt is to students of the course 
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titled Comparative Economic Policy. As a teacher, I get into contact with stu-
dents from various parts of the world who come from very different professions 
and have diverse work experience. Master students, with their professional 
background, already know a lot about the topics covered here: fiscal activity of 
the state, monetary measures of central banks, trade and competition regula-
tions of national and supranational agencies. 
These are grand subject for policy makers and those who are fascinated 
by politics. But the perspective of most readers is that of a policy taker. When 
you go after your business and profession, you do not know much about the 
motivations, drivers and routines of the policy makers, and you may not really 
care about the way decision makers behave. What you want to know how 
these decisions will influence your life and business. Since the students in my 
MBA classes come from various corners of the globe, they view government 
activities differently from each other. Some come from so-called high trust so-
cieties, others from low trust environment; some find global business players 
and international bodies embodiments of efficiency, while others look at them 
with mixed feelings. Their expectations about public sector and their attitude 
to the officialdom may also differ – when you write about economic policy is-
sues, you have to be prepared for the varieties of views, values and expecta-
tions of your readership. 
Now, policy making is a challenging task in itself as I have had to learn in 
various government duties during my life; but explaining the logic, tools, and 
moral (yes, moral – whatever people tend to say about the amoral nature of 
politics and politicians) of economic decision making is even harder. Given the 
national and professional stereotypes about governments and office holders, 
so widespread among the general public, it is a double challenge to address 
international audience. What helped me to understand better the decision 
making processes and also to explain them better to various audiences and 
stakeholders is my personal history, if this not too grand a term. Well, history 
has been generous to me. After graduation, I spent my early academic years 
working for a policy research institute that was closely attached to national 
planning and policy coordination. Managed regimes at that time still functioned 
but they gradually drifted away from the old model – and eventually failed to 
arrive to a new one within the same political regime. As a young economist, 
I lived through the transformation of a whole socio-economic system; mean-
while I accepted invitation to work as UNDP advisor to develop government 
institutions in what was called at that time the third world. Meanwhile history, 
more precisely geo-politics, changed gears, and the cold war suddenly ended. 
Politics, this time democratic politics, affected my life forcefully as I felt it to be 
my duties to take active part in the transition process of my native Hungary. As 
a Member of Parliament, a cabinet minister for trade and industry since 1990, I 
learned firsthand knowledge of the deep-going structural change that brought 
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back this trade-dependent middle-income economy to the market order. Later, 
at the central bank I faced similar transition challenges, mostly related to build-
ing and restoring monetary institutions and to restructuring the financial sector. 
History, or fate, again shaped my professional life: an academic-turned-pol-
itician, I left behind national policy making duties for serving on the board of 
an international financial institution. This was European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, London where in the board I represented the economic 
interests of no less than four nations. 
After this service abroad, I returned to my alma mater to teach. Besides, I ac-
cepted board duties at various transnational as well as domestic corporations. 
Different angles but the same reality: one is forced to look at and evaluate 
policy changes from various viewpoints. Thus my second debt is to colleagues 
at the central bank, in economic ministry, in academia and at the EBRD, in 
board rooms and in editorial boards. There is no room enough to name them 
all here; it would be impossible to do justice to all those colleagues who have 
shaped my professional life. 
Thirdly, I owe the debt of gratitude to those who encouraged me to sit down 
and develop lecture notes into a book, and who provided financial and editorial 
support. This exercise is going to be a success if there will be readers, and the 
lessons I have learnt during these decades will start resonating in them, too. 
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WHY STUDY COMPARATIVE 
ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING?
1.1 ON TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK
Economic policy is a rather general term. Policy itself has a very broad 
meaning, covering strategies, rules, decisions, and coordinated actions. The 
adjective economic specifies the target area of policy-making: it is about the 
economy. The term policy-making defines its nature:  officials take non-routine 
measures, important decisions and rulings.  
The above terms may sound a bit abstract but you can easily recognize 
economic policy actions and events when you see them. When a Minister of 
Finance (or Secretary of the Treasury or Chancellor of the Exchequer, depend-
ing on the country’s official nomenclature) presents ceremonially the annual 
budget to Parliament, this is a classic moment in economic policy-making of 
the nation. Similarly, the declaration of the change of the key interest rate by a 
central bank’s Monetary Policy Council is a prima facie policy-making event. 
These are examples of important and non-routine economic policy actions 
taken on government/national level. But not only high level functionaries of na-
tional authorities can be regarded policymakers. Provincial governments under 
a federal entity, States within the United States, Lӓnder in federal Germany, 
régions in France, and regional governments in many other countries do play 
significant economic roles. Therefore, the sub-national level can be of impor-
tance for the study of economic policy-making. 
Similarly, some policy actions are taken above national level. This is so with-
in the European Union – to be discussed later. Grand policy statements are 
often made at summits of global players (Group 7, Group 20) – although these 
and other multinational forums typically declare rather than take decisions. 
A lot is said about global governance but if you go by the amount of taxes 
collected and funds spent then national governments are still by far the most 
consequential players in economic policy context. Global forums such as G20 
or the occasional gatherings of national leaders (“Climate Summit”) or informal 
meetings in, say, the Swiss resort Davos may make headlines in news pro-
grams, but what is really important is what governments do. This is why this 
book will mostly discuss measures taken at the level of the nation-state even 
if must be always aware of the significance of other agents of complex web 
of decision making. For simplicity, here we will not dwell into the problems of 
policy issues at supra-national level or at sub-national (regional, local) level.
The term ‘policy-making’ is not restricted to public authorities and agencies, 
though. Market agents may also prepare strategy plans in order to make im-
portant business decisions. Global industrial groups such as the General Elec-
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tric and worldwide financial institutions such as HSBC or Deutsche Bank must 
certainly coordinate their activities. Group policies and projects may or may 
not be recorded in policy documents, but a certain planning and programming 
activity is simply necessary when the organization covers so many national 
markets and product lines. Similarly, international financial institutions, such 
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, do prepare country 
policy documents. In contrast with business players, international financial in-
stitutions (IFIs) customarily publish their country strategies that are generally 
peppered with advices offered for their member states. 
Public bodies and organizations within a country may also prepare and pub-
lish policy documents in order to influence the way the economy functions. 
Take a country where organized labour is powerful: there the trade union (TU) 
typically probably has a professional staff and its Economic Policy Unit pub-
lishes a policy paper offering analysis of the socio-economic situation and 
recommendations for the policy-makers of that country – from the particu-
lar viewpoint of (organized) labour. In countries with strong tripartite traditions 
the unions have similarly influential counterparts such as the Employers’ Fed-
eration or Chamber of Commerce (CC) or Business Council. These interest-
representing industry bodies may prepare and publish documents containing 
strategic goals and proposed coordination measures. The two sides, Labour 
and Capital, would then discuss their analysis with the third player, the central 
government, represented, as a rule, by the Ministry of Finance (MinFin). This 
is the corporatist decision making formula that you can find in some countries 
but corporatism may be totally missing in others. Well, nations differ a lot in 
terms of their legal and institutional systems, and also relating to the practice 
of taking economic policy measures.
All the mentioned business giants and the above non-government interest 
representing agencies shape events and exert an impact on business cycles. 
What they intend to do is very close to what a government agency of economic 
affairs does. Lobby firms, academic institutions, and civil organizations also 
have some impact on public policies. But for sake of brevity, policy-related ac-
tivities of non-government agents are left outside of the scope of this present 
work. 
Governance and size issues: big state and lean state, federal 
versus unitary state-centralized governance versus corporatist 
structure
State is a simple term that encompass a wide set of public 
institutions. Some states are complex and use up of a large part of the 
nation’s resources: one can call them “big state”. Other states are   
 relatively lean. 
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Please note that ‘big’ and ‘small’ in this respect do not refer to the 
size of the country but to the relative economic importance of the pub-
lic (governmental) sector within the given country. Some Scandinavian 
nations are small or medium, at best, in terms of number of inhabit-
ants or land size (Finland, Denmark) but their government centralizes 
into the budget a high portion of the country’s GDP, or we can say 
that the income centralization ratio is high. Well, this is unavoidable 
when the government provides public goods and offers generous wel-
fare services: a big portion of revenues of households and businesses 
will have to be paid into state coffers in forms of taxes and duties. 
High redistribution ratio means different things to different people: a 
good message to those who receive the goodies, and bad news for 
taxpayers. Even if you personally are even with your imaginary ac-
count with the state, you have reason to be alarmed about the risks 
of big bureaucracies. Yes, there are good reasons to worry if annual 
public expenditures exceed half of the overall national income (GDP) 
of a given society even if your taxes are spent on good causes: on 
generous welfare services, excellent public utilities, funding free pub-
lic services. In contrast, lean states are those where a smaller share 
of the national income is collected and spent by the state, and thus 
people and businesses do not have to pay high taxes. The obvious 
downside: certain public goods and services (clean and safe streets, 
affordable education and healthcare, antipoverty agencies) are less 
generously funded. Other nations having medium sized states; reality, 
as we will see it in this Chapter, is surprisingly diverse in this respect. 
There are various other features and measures that characterize 
the size and activity of the state: one aspect is the relative impor-
tance of public ownership of firms (are state-owned enterprises or 
SOEs may be important participant of the given economy). Anoth-
er key aspect is the regulatory activity of the given state: do regula-
tors keep markets and agents under close and detailed control or do 
they leave a lot to self-regulation. No country is free from public par-
ticipation and governmental scrutiny but nations vary a lot: you may 
call some varieties “free market” economies while for others the term 
“managed economy” is the proper description – as we will see later. 
Certain states are efficient, some others perform less efficient-
ly, a few may drift from crisis to crisis. Some others are even re-
ferred to as failed states. One can even hear about quasi states. 
There are kingdoms, yet most states are republics. The legal and 
constitutional forms of states may have similarities, but the nearly two 
hundred states of the globe are in reality extremely varied in terms of 
how they perform and what they actually do. To start with, let us just 
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consider the formal features of modern states. The legal and political 
structure of a given country is called unitary if the central (general) gov-
ernment collects and spends most of the public funds and is responsi-
ble for the public sector resource allocation, leaving a limited role only 
for sub-national entities (Regions, Counties, States, Lӓnder, etc). Slo-
vakia, Ireland, and Hungary are typically unitary republics where most 
decision-making competences rest with the central government; there 
exist sub-national regional entities but without real economic policy 
significance. In contrast, Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) is 
federal not only in name but in economic matters as well: the regional 
administrative units (Lӓnder) do dispose of significant resources. Some 
states may be hard to classify either unitary or federal as in real life cer-
tain regional economic functions always coexist with top-level decision 
making authorities. What helps in classification is, among others, the 
relative share of the central governmental level in overall public revenues 
(taxes, levies) and in public expenditures: in a truly federal system the 
share of the sub-national (regional, municipal) level must be significant. 
Another important aspect of governance is whether a given country’s 
decision making structure is highly centralized into  elected bodies 
or social partners play an important role. The latter case is also referred 
to as corporatist structure: social partners of the national government 
(the representatives of the employers, and those of the employees) take 
integral part in decisions through established processes. New member 
states of the EU are typically centralized entities where the participa-
tion of interest representation bodies (chamber of commerce, employ-
ers’ federation, and various trade unions) is mostly ad hoc within the 
national decision making process. In contrast, Germany and the Nor-
dic countries follow their tripartite governance traditions. Their trade 
unions, employer federations and the relevant government authorities 
regularly interact in order to reach, if possible, common positions on 
major economic policy issues through a policy dialogue. 
Countries, as can be seen, may differ a lot concerning their formal 
(constitutional) governance structure. In addition to formal structure, 
one may add the informal and legally nonbinding collaboration of the 
government with interest representative and other civic bodies (in-
dustrial and professional associations, regional authorities, lobbyists, 
NGOs) – a practice active on some countries and absent in others.
The above institutional-legal governance differences and the varie-
ties of cultures of decision making must be acknowledged and taken 
into account in our study of particular country cases, and in comparing 
national practices.    
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Business strategy makers and non-state institutions may well prepare busi-
ness plans, strategy studies, and policy documents that contain strategic as-
pects and coordination measures; still they are mostly outside of the scope of 
this present volume. The focus here is on national level: policy actions by the 
State (government). Throughout in this book, the term ‘economic policy’ will 
basically refer to state (governmental) activity, leaving aside policy initiatives 
and action plans of market agents, NGOs and municipalities however impor-
tant their positions, views, decisions, and voices might be for the economic 
life of the given country. Thus, here we will mostly use the term in the narrow 
sense: economic policy-making refers to taking important (non-trivial and non-
routine) government measures in a coordinated manner. 
Institutions, and rules of national level economic policy-making – important, 
of course, you may still ask: national level – is it still relevant? What about the 
consequences of globalization? Products, funds, ideas, and people cross na-
tional boarders quite naturally. Goods and services are typically produced within 
a long value chain with pieces sourced in a large number of countries. In a world 
of intensive international exchange, it is even hard to tell where one “national 
economy” ends and another starts. Does national economy exist at all? Aren’t 
major economic decisions taken at global level? Once a country joins an inter-
national body such as the OECD or signs an international convention on, say, 
climate protection or fishery in open waters, its government must accept certain 
limits to its discretionary power. International treaties pressure a government to 
reduce tariffs, which is good for businesses and customers, but it will result in 
less revenue of the state, and may increase the mobility of business activity. This 
has become the rule by now after decades of multilateral intergovernmental ne-
gotiations – though at the time of writing, disruptive forces are also present, and 
the term “trade war” is back in the pages of newspapers. 
Still, one may claim that modern economies are open to trade and financial 
flows, and consequently domestic politicians cannot do too much about it, or 
only at their own (and their nation’s) peril. Therefore, on analyzing a particular 
country’s economic policy stance you must always take into account the interna-
tional context and the particular national/international interface in the given case. 
1.2 YES, MODERN ECONOMIES ARE OPEN. BUT TO 
WHAT DEGREE? AND HOW OPENNESS INFLUENCES 
POLICY-MAKING? 
Businesses, whether small, medium or large sized, functioning within small-
to-medium nations routinely transcend political borders during their customary 
activities. A Dutch insurer, an Austrian bank, a French carmaker, a Hungar-
ian IT consultancy, and a Polish automotive component manufacturer will do 
cross-border businesses as a matter-of-fact. The value chain of a complex 
18 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD: ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
product may cross scores of administrative and legal borders. 
High intensity of economic openness characterizes all European nations. 
There remain very few closed economies in the Globe – North Korea may be 
such an extreme case. Nations do conduct trade with neighbours or, increas-
ingly in modern times, with faraway destinations. Moneys travel particularly 
easy unless administrative hurdles restrict their flow in some forms of currency 
control. Big nations, it is true, have big domestic markets that offer enough 
opportunities for local firms to sell and buy. Consequently, countries with large 
population such as the United States or China or India are naturally less de-
pendent on foreign trade. You may also say they are less open in this respect 
than smaller entities such as Hong Kong, Luxemburg and Singapore, to quote 
extreme cases. Ireland, Slovakia, Hungary, and many other medium or smaller 
sized countries of Europe are also very much open to trade and finance. 
The simplest measures to place a given country on the ‘very open-less open-
closed’ scale are trade intensity ratios: the volume of exports (Ex) or imports 
(Im) or foreign trade volume (Ex+Im) against gross domestic product (GDP):
 (1) Ex/GDP denotes export intensity
 (2) Im/GDP – import intensity 
 (3) (Ex+Im)/GDP is called trade intensity.
Export, import and trade intensity ratios range from nil to well over hundred 
per cent. Can a ratio be at all above 100 per cent of domestic product? Oh, 
yes. Do not forget that foreign trade flows are gross statistics while GDP is a 
measure of value added generated in a given country. Trading nations routinely 
import materials, parts and investment goods to process them by adding their 
labour input and selling the products and services profitably to foreign buyers 
– and a huge volume of trade is generated in the process. Other economies 
are better endowed with natural resources, and are not forced to import that 
much. It is not surprising that big countries tend to have lower than average 
foreign trade intensity, even if they are great export engines such as China or 
Japan, as they also possess sizable domestic markets. Smaller states with lim-
ited size of domestic markets, however, depend much more on export markets 
and they have high import intensity as well. 
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Chart 1/1
More trade typically goes with more income: openness and level of GDP
Source: http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/picture-trade-getting-richer-trading-more.  
Note: Openness to merchandise trade is the value of merchandise trade (exports plus imports) 
as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). GDP is calculated using purchasing power parity 
(PPP) in constant 2011 dollars. Data in the chart that shows time-series for individual countries are 
portrayed as three-year moving averages.
This is an interesting chart. You can see a rather solid correlation between 
two economic variables: one is national income, more precisely gross domes-
tic product (GDP) on the horizontal axis, and trade openness on the vertical 
axis. Wealthy countries tend to be found, not without exceptions, around or 
above the average openness (trade-to-GDP) mark. The correlation is not line-
ar; it rather looks like a Chinese hat: higher than average income countries tend 
to have higher openness but only up to a certain income level: the maximum of 
the hat-shape curve average line is in the range of Korea-Germany-Denmark in 
terms of GDP per capita. Some countries, such as Hungary, Netherland, Slo-
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vakia are well above the average curve: they are exceptionally open countries. 
Japan or the USA are rich but less open than the global average; others are 
also less open but much less advanced.  
The chart is interesting not only for the varieties of national figures and for its 
shape of the average, but also because connection of the two economic varia-
bles is complex and causality is not easily understood. Being more open trade-
wise, does that contribute to higher income level? Or, as a nation grows richer, 
will this fact contribute to higher capacity to export, and as a consequence: 
also more import? If you put the issue in perspective, you may conclude that 
relationship runs in both directions: the richer a country becomes, the more it 
tends to trade; similarly, countries that are open to trade, tend to be rich as 
well. But the spread of national data is so large, and there are so many outly-
ing data that any general statement will be of limited value for the students of 
economic development and for the policy makers of the nations concerned.
You must notice that we use GDP, a familiar macroeconomic variable. 
GDP per capita as it appears on the chart is gross domestic product of the 
given country divided by the number of population of the country. This is a 
customary used statistical indicator used in the context of a country’s income 
level or more generally, level of advancement. However common is it to use 
this indicator for economic wellbeing, one should be aware of its limitations 
to measure the national income, or particularly the wellbeing of the society. 
Advancement and wealth are all rather complex phenomena. They really are 
too complex to measure them with one single indicator. Also please note the 
letters PPP – we will discuss their significance later. 
Lower trade intensity does not implies in itself the case of a closed economy: 
it simply indicates the relative position of the given country on the open–closed 
scale. High trade intensity certainly does involve high dependence on foreign 
markets, and this fact has a strong impact on the room of national policy-making.
Let us focus on a set of economies of the same advancement level and of 
similar historical background. Central and Eastern Europe have by now be-
come particularly open in the above sense: the overall volume of their export 
flows measured against their national income (GDP) is close to hundred (see 
Chart 2). Imports are similarly high; overall trade volume may surpass 200 per 
cent of GDP. Their relative openness is impressive (with the exception of Poland 
and Romania) when one compares their ratios with the data of West-European 
economies, members of the Euro-zone. Still, there are pretty large dispersion 
of the data set; and there must be economic reasons behind divergent values. 
Guess why Poland’s trade openness ratio is lower than, say, Slovakia’s! 
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Chart 1/ 2
Export of goods and services as percent of GDP
Source: Eurostat. CEE10 refers to mentioned new EU member states, EA12 entails the original 
Eurozone countries
Central Eastern Europe may be a special case; reasons behind the extreme 
high trade intensity will be discussed later. But trade and finance openness 
is the norm in modern times. The progress of economic development is as-
sociated with increasing trade intensity in longer term, as seen in Chart 3. The 
trends are impressive. Still, note the blip in per capita GDP in 2009 – the year 
of ‘great recession’. And also take note of the much steeper but transitional 
contraction of trade intensity in the same year. You may guess the answer why. 
 
Chart 1/3
GDP per capita and share of export of goods and services in world GDP
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Economic and financial openness sounds an abstract macroeconomic term 
but it in fact has a strong impact on the behaviour of firms, consumers and, as 
a consequence, of the government. In open, trade dependent countries busi-
ness and political decision makers must look carefully at events that take place 
in the world economy. This statement by no means implies that global forces 
determine everything. States still matter: the importance of national govern-
ments in influencing the business cycle and shaping social conditions and 
constraints of economic growth would be hard to question. Recent financial 
crises prove that governments matter. The role of government policies in han-
dling the market disturbances has increased in recent time, as the weekly The 
Economist put it in 2009: the State is back.
1.3. AN ASIDE ON FREE TRADE AND COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE – OR: WHY ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM OF 
MR TRUMP EARNED HIM VOTES IN CAPITALIST USA?
Trade between willing partners adds to overall wellbeing of parties con-
cerned – this is one of the age-old axioms of economics (see attachments for 
Chapter One). Still, fear of trade, particularly with foreigners, is as old as trade 
itself. Protectionism may be an economic fallacy (it IS bad economics) but a 
fallacy that is as old as anything else about the economy. 
State protectionism was perhaps the first elaborate political economy con-
cept, dating back to the 18th century. Its central tenets and recommenda-
tions were crushed intellectually by early classicals as Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. Adam Smith efficiently criticised the mercantilist views of his age. The 
mercantilist believes that your gain is my loss; we would now formulate this be-
lief as ’trade being a zero sum game’. For mercantilists, money was gold, and 
the aim of economic activity was to hoard as much gold as possible. Adam 
Smith proved that specialization into area where you enjoy absolute compara-
tive advantage will increase welfare to both parties. David Ricardo enlarged 
the theory to cover a more general case whereby a trading country has no 
absolute advantage over a competitor but still has comparative advantage and 
thus trade is possible and mutually advantageous. 
Note that low wage does not appear in this argument at all as it is not a 
reason in itself for international trade. Wage differences are important but not 
in themselves but as part of the conditions that define comparative advan-
tages of any economy. Wage is important in many ways: for the employed, it 
is income, for the employer, it is one of the expenditures. There are, of course, 
other main types of expenditures, notably the cost of capital, but taxes also 
appear in cost calculations of the business enterprise. 
Modern trade theories look behind the simple wage and cost of capital 
calculation, and point out phenomena such as inter-industry trade driven by 
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economies of scale and economies of scope considerations. Transaction costs 
can be powerful explanations for modern flows in goods, services and funds, 
and they may explain why business activities tend to move to clusters. Trade 
nowadays flows particularly through transnational (multinational) companies 
– that is within complex sets of business organizations that do organize their 
activity across national borders. This is why modern realities differ a lot from 
the classical ’one country trades with another country’ pattern.  
Protectionism and mercantilism may be based on fallacies and they are bad 
economics - yet they prove to be virulent. The view that free trade is good is 
not shared by all, and the rejection of the classical liberal canon may be due 
to various reasons, and some of them will deserve proper consideration. First, 
textbook conditions of an obviously mutually advantageous exchanges (“win-
win”) do not always hold in real life. Second, even is the overall balance of 
trading goods/services is positive for both nations, the win of one party may 
much exceed the win of the other party – and the latter may feel offended 
or just being simply jealous about the success of the other party. Third, an 
overall “win” balance of a trading nation is typically an aggregate amount that 
may mask some very fortunate parties as well as a limited number of losers 
(and many unaffected) within the nation concerned. The losers, who may be a 
small but identifiable minority, may complain loudly and convincingly about the 
losses they had to endure due to free trade – and unorganized winners of free 
trade, who are not always aware of their gains, consumers for instance, tend 
to remain passive. These and other factors will always create a constituency 
against free trade, whatever economic geniuses like Adam Smith and Ricardo 
said about the matters. 
It may be very much true that the United States of America, one of the crea-
tors and the lynchpin of the post-WW2 international economic order, is on 
the whole the biggest winner of (relatively) free trade of our age – but not 
everybody feels like that. ‘Feeling’ – may be a soft term in economics. But not 
in politics. The way people (voters) feel about issues like global warming, the 
Earth being flat or not, free trade as win-win game or a “win-loss” situation, 
the dangers of smoking, to name a few debate-provoking issues, resonate in 
politics. Feelings, beliefs, mind sets, ideologies – they may be soft factors in 
professional debates but they still have a strong impact on politics, politicians, 
and government policies. Let us just look at the mental map of the Ameri-
can public concerning the fairness of foreign trade with particular nations (see 
below). Some people regard certain trading partners unfair while the same 
people find other nation being fair counterparts. The views change by time, 
and depends a lot on the respondents’ general political views (Democrat or 
Republican), and are influenced by variables such as age, gender, occupation, 
level of education, experience in business, etc.          
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Chart 1/4
a) Americans’ perceptions of fairness in trade relationships
  b)
b) How have views shifted since 1993
c) Breakdown of the public views by political affiliation
Source: Visual Capitalist, http://www.visualcapitalist.com/america-trade-relationships-fair/
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The message of the survey is that trade with Canada is believed to be fair 
(and thus probably favourable for both sides) by the majority of the American, 
while the opposite is true for China. Trade with Mexico has slight negative rat-
ing. It is interesting to see how the present American public looks at Japan – a 
country that was seen as a menace in the 1990s. Attitudes change by time 
(or, alternatively, the trading practice of the given partner may have changed 
meanwhile). Japan is not seen by many as an unfair competitor. Perhaps a 
number of Americans do work for Japanese owned businesses and knows 
more about the issue, or a Japanese business model has evolved in time, or 
other nations have become the target of criticism. Attitude of the American 
public toward China did not appear in the 1993 survey (at that time the Chi-
nese economy was but an emerging economy and not among the key trading 
partners of the US). 
The increasing trust in the fairness of the Japanese trade practice is, how-
ever, an exception: the American public opinion has by and large taken a more 
distrusting position towards the major trading partners of the USA. Mexico is 
rated to be the worst, but even Canada has slipped back on the list of those 
viewed to be fair. Is this change of attitude driven by more negative personal 
experience? Or is it rather about general attitudes, national stereotypes? It 
might be an interesting sociological topic to determine what shapes views 
like these: it is certainly illuminating how much political affiliation and values 
influence economic policy views such as those concerning fairness in trade. 
Democrat-leaning respondents seem to assume more fairness about these 
mentioned countries, and probably about international trade as such, than Re-
publicans would. Which is a non-trivial result, given that the Republicans have 
traditionally been thought to be the “party of business” – and most business 
people believe in the usefulness of trade in general, and foreign trade, in par-
ticular. Now, we have here again a case where the simple ‘right’ and ‘left’ tags 
do not seem to apply in the old ways. The data also shed some light on the 
drivers of the rather surprising election success of Trump in a big (but divided) 
country that, as the biggest economy (yet) in global scale, gains a lot from 
trade, and provides the biggest market for existing and potential exporters.  
This particular American case warns us that the economic policy course of 
any given government (particularly in democratic societal system, sensitive to 
the views, beliefs, values, experiences as well as biased and prejudiced con-
ceptions of the general public) will be much influenced by politics, social fac-
tors, ideological components – on top of ‘hard’ economic factors and rational 
decision making logic.     
26 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD: ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
1.4 ECONOMIES DIFFER. HOW TO MEASURE 
DIFFERENCES?
Nations and states are different. Relative sizes of the public sector, fiscal condi-
tions of governments, political situations as well as economic conditions cause 
differences across nations. This is true even for the member states of the Europe-
an Union that are so closely harmonized in many aspects of economy and society. 
The different relative size of government spending, public sector employ-
ment and state ownership in modern mixed economies explain a lot of the 
rich variety of economic policies applied by national governments. But there 
are other explaining factors for the variability of policies across nations. Even 
if growth conditions and social circumstances were similar, political situations 
and value systems differ. Policy variability is due, among others, to the par-
ticular political colour of any given government: left-leaning or right-leaning is 
a customary, if somewhat ambiguous, classification of policy lines. Countries 
under longer time leftish, social democratic governments are typically charac-
terized by high redistribution ratio (annual government expenditures against 
annual GDP). Right-leaning, conservative governments tend to come to power 
promising lower taxations and lower public spending (and consequently lower 
redistribution ratio). In the former case, we can expect a ‘big government’ as 
against the second case, closer to the concept of ’lean state’. 
Chart 1/5
Government expenditures as percent of GDP in Europe, 2015
Source: http://www.debtclocks.eu/eu-ranking-total-government-expenditure-in-percent-of-gdp.
html 
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General government spending, measured either by its share of GDP or cal-
culated per person, is indicative of the role and significance of the government 
in a given country, and the ratios are helpful for comparison across countries. 
General government spending generally consists of central, state and local 
governments, and social security funds. The large variation of this indicator 
highlights the variety of countries’ approaches to delivering public goods and 
services and providing social protection. Doctrinal foundations (ideologies, 
values) of policies may also have consequences on the size of the central 
government in terms of spending, as we have just remarked, or in government 
employment. Conservative governments tend to run (or at least: promise) a 
smaller state that is spending a bit less and thus taxing the public a bit less 
than socialist or social democratic governments. 
Governments come and go, political ideas may change, and still some coun-
tries are characterized by a larger public sector while others have lean states. 
It seems some countries just happen to accept (and even expect) the govern-
ment to spend a lot on good causes. The Scandinavian nations, famously, 
have been accustomed to high spending governments – even though high 
spending presupposes, unfortunately, high tax rates. In contrast, the so-called 
‘Anglo-Saxon” nations do not entrust the government to spend much on the 
taxpayers’ behalf, and voters have systematically supported parties that are 
not seen as high spenders. 
Look at the chart, and try to figure out which nation belongs to what sub-
set of countries, or what party ideology must be the dominant view in any 
given country. Do not be upset if your guesses prove to be wrong. Tax and 
expenditure policies and the relative size of the public sector are influenced by 
too many factors to figure out without detailed knowledge of the history and 
present situation of the countries concerned. Still, have a try: what do you think 
of, say, Hungary’s position on the above list? Hint: compare it with those of its 
peers: Slovakia, Romania, Poland, and Czech Republic. 
1.5 IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL VALUES ALSO 
DIFFER AND THEY HAVE STRONG IMPACT ON 
POLICY MATTERS 
Political and value-related differences can be detected in other aspects of 
the economy. Here is, among others, the issue of inflation or put differently, the 
case of price stability. Socials democratic governments are thought to toler-
ate inflation, but are sensitive on unemployment and income differential, while 
conservative governments tend to do their utmost to uphold the purchasing 
power of the currency, even if price level stabilization may lead to temporary in-
crease in unemployment. There is an unpleasant trade-off, in many instances, 
between increase in the price level and the increase of unemployment rate. 
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You may beat price increases through drastic policy cures that, unfortunately, 
have a side effect: it increases the number of the unemployed. You as a min-
ister of finance still want to protect the purchasing power of the currency, but 
you must know the ‘price’ of it in terms of some slowdown in economic output, 
and with is, less demand for labour. 
Chart 1/5
Inflation rates in selected OECD countries, 2011-2019
https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm
The black line registers the OECD inflation average since 2011. Against this 
background, one can judge the inflationary performance of the countries cho-
sen here for comparison. Mexico, blue line, has had an above-average infla-
tion history in recent years (and before that, too). Hungary, coloured yellow, 
had a period of inflation above the average but fell below it in the mid-period, 
after the financial crisis of 2008/2009. The end-value is well above 3 per cent 
(which is the target for medium term inflation set by the Hungarian central 
bank). This figure in itself is not problematic, still, if you take a longer look, you 
may call Hungary a relatively inflation-prone country. Germany, or Switzerland, 
the Netherland, not presented here, can be seen as bastion of price stability, 
with price increases systematically below the OECD average. Japan, however, 
has registered price index below the zero line, meaning that the country has 
experienced a period of deflation – which is the opposite of inflation. Deflation 
has been rare until recently, while inflation has been with us for decades. In 
earlier decades, Italy had a long period of high inflation, under the Lira period 
– but that was before entry into the euro zone. Now, Italians may have lots of 
economic problems but lack of price stability is not among them this time: their 
headline inflation lines are most of the time below the OECD average. United 
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Kingdom, having its currency of its own, has proved to be slightly more infla-
tionary than the rest of the OECD club. A headline inflation rate of 2.6 per cent, 
as recorded in the summer of 2017, was not worrying but still was a sign of 
prices moving measurably up. What is behind such an acceleration of inflation 
at a time when the business cycle is not especially strong may be the weaken-
ing of the pound. 
Inflation measured by consumer price index (CPI) is defined as the change 
(typically increase) in the prices of a basket of goods and services that are 
customarily purchased by the households. This is the headline inflation that 
appears on front page if it happens to be too high, or in the business pages 
in small letters if its annual growth rate is just normal. Inflation rate is a proper 
measure of the erosion of the currency’s purchasing power; still an annual one 
to two per cent increase of price level is seen “just good”. Why zero is not 
“good”?  Why “inflation targeting” aims at maintaining a small but positive rate 
of increase, rather than zero?
First, a consumer price index is counted by measuring the period-to-period 
price changes of a pre-determined set of consumer goods and services, as-
suming that quality and characteristics are constant. In reality, quality of goods 
is not the same. If better and more reliable cars, faster computers, more eco-
nomic appliances come to market with the same or just slightly higher price 
tag, a simple measurement of the new prices to the old may report inflation 
– when there is none. This is a methodological reasoning why a bit of price 
level increase is wanted. The other reason has to do with buyers’ pshychol-
ogy. Fixed, or particularly declining, price level may discourage buyers to buy. 
If potential buyers postpone their shopping intentions in expectation of lower 
future prices, that would do harm to business. For these and other reasons the 
European Central Bank (ECB) defines price stability as annual CPI increase 
remaining in the band between zero and 2 per cent, closer to the latter value. 
Higher than that headline inflation, particularly a two-digit annual consumer 
price increase is something that any proper central bank would avoid or fight 
against with all measures at its disposal.  
For some years, interestingly, inflation was not a major concern for policy 
makers. Low oil and other commodity prices and cheap industrial goods pro-
duced by Chinese and similarly low wage producers kept down global price 
level even before the financial crisis of 2008-2009. During the financial turmoil, 
people were not eager to buy that much, and reduced demand is deflationary. 
But low and falling global prices are not always the case: for long decades, 
fighting inflation was a major policy task for central banks and governments. 
The decision to go ahead with a price-level stabilization policy is a hard one: 
you as a key minister may not avoid it once sales prices grow fast. What you 
choose is probably much influenced by your government’s values and ideol-
ogy (right or left), and the political conditions. If the next general election is 
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just months away, your government will probably step back from bold policy 
measures that promise a slowdown in inflationary trends. Such a manoeuver 
may by justified professionally – but would lead to axing thousands of jobs – 
you’d rather not do that. That is called Realpolitik – a German word but a rather 
general phenomenon in democracies. 
Another distinguishing aspect of policy-making is the economic theoretic 
background (if any) of policymakers. They may follow Keynesian demand man-
agement or may choose to apply supply side or monetarist policies (on Key-
nesianism, see in later chapter). Or politicians may simply resort to a ’policy 
cocktail’ of their own concoction. In the same country, successive govern-
ments may follow very different policies, depending on party affiliation or on 
personal factors such as the beliefs and values of key decision makers. 
1.7 POLICY MAINSTREAM AND ‘BEST PRACTICE’
Still, there are certain economic policy trends in every given time period. 
Fashion is not the term that comes to your mind first when you talk of policy 
ideas, yet something similar is the case: a sort of best practice in economic 
policy-making is in vogue at one given moment. This is what you may call pol-
icy mainstream. Few, if any, government can, free of costs, go against widely 
shared policy tendencies, particularly within a policy community such as G20, 
or OECD, or Eurozone, or the EU. Membership in international structures (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, Bank for International 
Settlements, to name a few) is a source of knowledge but also a constraint on 
the room of maneuver of national policy-makers. 
Policy-making habits are influenced indirectly by the practice of neighbour-
ing countries. National governments can assimilate other countries’ practices 
through the process of policy transfer across nations supported, say, via techni-
cal assistance (TA) provided by international institutions such as the World Bank. 
It is customary to tie loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from 
the World Bank to economic policy conditionality – a pronounced form of policy 
transfer from a supranational body to the government of the borrower country. 
Being on the brink of bankruptcy, and thus forced to borrow from the IMF, the 
borrower government does not have much choice but accept the IMF ‘recom-
mendations’ attached to IMF loans. One may argue that in such cases the eco-
nomic sovereignty of the country concerned is in fact limited. In cases of private 
sector borrowing, there are generally no direct policy conditions attached to 
the loan. Still, lenders may expect certain “good behaviour” from the borrowing 
side; these expectations are not as transparent as those that go with an IMF 
loan negotiation. Formal sovereignty – which is a legal and political term – does 
not mean that the government is totally free to choose its goals and measures. 
Fashions and trends in economics doctrines also exist, similarly to the exist-
ence of ’best practice’ in industry. The successful country cases may become 
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patterns (“models”) for others. Model economies may exert influence on the 
decision making practice across borders.
Therefore, similarities and differences of economic policy-making processes 
coexist in our globalized contemporary world. These varieties constitute the 
subject of the comparative economic policy (CEP) as an applied academic 
discipline. It is about understanding particular country cases and government 
practices, and contrasting them with general concepts of ‘good policies’. It 
is also important from doing business perspective to fathom the movers of a 
particular policy regime that differs from the accepted international practices.
Concept checks
Economic openness – what it means and how to measure it
export intensity of a country; import intensity, foreign trade openness
correlation between two variables
national income redistribution ratio in a country
income centralization ratio in a country
policy transfer – what it actually means
national level – sub-national level – supranational level decisions
social partners
corporatism in national level decision making 
big government, lean government
federal nature versus unitary nature of governance
inflation/deflation – what it means and how to measure it
transaction costs
End-of-chapter questions
„Japan and the USA are relatively closed economies.” Is it true or not? Right 
answer: 1 bonus point. How can you prove that your answer is correct? Right 
answer: 9 bonus points.  What are the economic policy consequences of the 
right answer? This is a trillion-dollar bonus question.
Why international policy transfer does not easily work well? What can go 
wrong with foreign advisors?
How can you tell by looking at macroeconomic data if a country belongs to the 
unitary constitutional model? (A hint: you consult the structure of general budget 
outlays, and see if central budget represents the vast majority of public spending.)
What indicators suggest that a given country has a corporatist nature? (Hint: 
look at unionization rate of wage earners; count the number of interest rep-
resentation bodies – too many small trade associations do not typically carry 
much weight in policy making dialogues.) 
What are the rational arguments about the merits of market-intermediated 
transactions (trade, that is), and why are there so many who reject free trade, 
and particular international trade as a potential source of added value?
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A primer on free trade
Free trade is the ability of people to undertake economic transactions with peo-
ple in other countries free from any restraints imposed by governments or other 
regulators. This is never so in real life; but measured by the volume of imports 
and exports, world trade has become increasingly free in the decades since the 
Second World War. A fall in barriers to trade, as a result of the general agreement 
on tariffs and trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
has helped stimulate this growth. The volume of world merchandise trade at the 
start of the 21st century was about 17 times what it was in 1950, and the world’s 
total output was not even six times as big. The ratio of world exports to GDP had 
more than doubled since 1950. 
For economists, the benefits of free trade are explained by the theory of com-
parative advantage, with each country doing those things in which it is compar-
atively more efficient (see Primer on comparative advantage). As long as each 
country specialises in products in which it has a comparative advantage, trade will 
be mutually beneficial. Some critics of free trade argue that trade with developing 
countries, where wages are usually lower and working hours longer than in devel-
oped countries, is unfair and will wipe out jobs in high-wage countries. Few want 
outright autarky, an extreme ‘solution’ to the national competitiveness issue, but 
many do demand corrective rules/interventions under the term ‘fair trade’. 
Real-world trade patterns sometimes seem to challenge the theory of com-
parative advantages. Most trade interestingly occurs between countries that 
do not have huge cost differences. The biggest trading partner of the United 
States, for instance, is Canada. Well over half the exports from France, Ger-
many and Italy go to other EU countries, and these countries sell similar things 
to each other: cars made in France are exported to Germany, and German cars 
go to France. Part of the reasons seems to be cross-border differences in con-
sumer tastes. Agricultural exports of Australia, say, or Saudi Arabia’s reliance 
on exporting oil, clearly stem from their particular stock of natural resources. 
Poorer countries often have abundant unskilled labour, so they export simple 
manufactures such as clothing. There are various types of cross-border flows, 
driven by various particular business conditions. 
On comparative advantage
Paul Samuelson, one of the 20th century’s greatest economists, once re-
marked that the principle of comparative advantage was the only big idea that 
economics had produced that was both true and surprising. It is also one of the 
oldest theories in economics, usually ascribed to Ricardo. The theory underpins 
the economic case for free trade. But it is often misunderstood or misrepresent-
ed by opponents of free trade. It shows how countries can gain from trading with 
each other even if one of them is more efficient – it has an absolute advantage 
– in every sort of economic activity. Comparative advantage is about identifying 
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which activities a country (or firm or individual) is most efficient at doing. 
To see how this theory works imagine two countries, Alpha and Omega. 
Each country has 1,000 workers and can make two goods, computers and 
cars. Alpha’s economy is far more productive than Omega’s. To make a car, 
Alpha needs two workers, compared with Omega’s four. To make a computer, 
Alpha uses 10 workers, compared with Omega’s 100. If there is no trade, and 
in each country half the workers are in each industry, Alpha produces 250 cars 
and 50 computers and Omega produces 125 cars and 5 computers. 
What if the two countries decide to specialise? Although Alpha makes both 
cars and computers more efficiently than Omega (it has an absolute advan-
tage), it has a bigger edge in computer making. So it now devotes most of its 
resources to that industry, employing 700 workers to make computers and 
only 300 to make cars. This raises computer output to 70 and cuts car produc-
tion to 150. Omega switches entirely to cars, turning out 250. 
World output of both goods has risen. Both countries can consume more of both 
if they trade, but at what price? Neither will want to import what it could make more 
cheaply at home. So Alpha will want at least 5 cars per computer, and Omega 
will not give up more than 25 cars per computer. Suppose the terms of trade are 
fixed at 12 cars per computer and 120 cars are exchanged for 10 computers. Then 
Alpha ends up with 270 cars and 60 computers, and Omega with 130 cars and 10 
computers. Both are better off than they would be if they did not trade. 
This is true even though Alpha has an absolute advantage in making both com-
puters and cars. The reason is that each country has a different comparative ad-
vantage. Alpha’s edge is greater in computers than in cars. Omega, although a 
costlier producer in both industries, is a less expensive maker of cars. If each 
country specialises in products in which it has a comparative advantage, both will 
gain from trade. 
In essence, the theory of comparative advantage says that it pays countries to 
trade because they are different. It is impossible for a country to have no com-
parative advantage in anything. It may be the least efficient at everything, but it will 
still have a comparative advantage in the industry in which it is relatively least bad. 
There is no reason to assume that a country’s comparative advantage will be 
static. If a country does what it has a comparative advantage in and sees its in-
come grow as a result, it can afford better education and infrastructure. These, in 
turn, may give it a comparative advantage in other economic activities in future.
http://www.economist.com/research/economics
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2.1 COMPARATIVE POLITICS – WE ALL COMPARE 
BUT IT IS NOT EASY TO FIND THE RELEVANT 
COMPARATOR
Whenever one declares a particular economic policy course good or bad, 
efficient or ineffective, you base your judgment, instinctively, on comparison: 
taking prior periods or other countries’ cases as benchmarks. Let us consider 
a government that is about to introduce an import duty: you instinctively place 
this measure into the context of international customs environment. Similarly, 
with a new tax measure, people would compare the new rates to the previous 
rates, or maybe to those of other nations. Any new industry regulation measure 
will be instantly rated against former regimes in the same country or against 
corresponding regulatory practices elsewhere. 
The same is true when you form your opinion on economic performance 
data of a given country. Concrete figures make sense in relationships with 
previous data (intertemporal comparison) and with figures of other nations (in-
ternational comparison). Let us take an example: whether the actual unem-
ployment rate in country N is to be considered high or not. Try to be objective, 
since those affected will feel it too high anyway whatever the official rate is. 
Well, the case can be settled by measuring the rate either a) against the historic 
trend in that same country, or b) against the unemployment rate of country M 
or of other nations in comparable situation. In this sense, any judgment about 
the macroeconomic situation and the corrective economic policy measures is, 
in fact, comparative. 
Local conditions, of course, differ. Thus, instinctive comparison – that is 
measuring something against arbitrary criteria – may lead to superficial state-
ments in the fashion of mixing apples and oranges.1 In order to avoid illogical 
or pointless macroeconomic comparisons, one should identify peers who are 
genuinely comparable concerning level of development and country size. There 
are numerous comparative classifications of countries; one of the most widely 
used groupings is published by the World Bank (WB). It arranges the world’s 
1 The customary ’apple-orange’ pairing in the English language is a telling case of 
social determinism of the language, putting apple – a widespread and well known 
European fruit – against orange, a customary good for sea-going nations such as the 
British. In contrast, continental European nations had regarded orange a sort of rarity 
for ages before the era of global trade flows. The two fruits that come to mind first 
and thus appear in the respective saying in the Hungarian language are apple and 
pear. But times have changed: in the fruit section of Hungarian supermarkets the en-
try 1 on the self service measurement device is for banana. In my youth, banana was 
very rare in shops, one could buy it perhaps around Christmas time or at important 
political occasions when the authorities responsible for domestic supply decided to 
authorize the import (hard currency import item, that is) of banana.   
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economies into four income groups – high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and 
low – basing the assignment on gross national income (GNI) per capita calcu-
lated. GNI is a similar but not identical to GDP measure of national income. The 
unit for this particular measuring exercise is current US Dollars. That immedi-
ately raises the issue of translating local incomes and expenditures into figures 
denominated USD, the national currency of the United States.  
Table 2/1
Classification of countries at World Bank 
 classification  GNI per capita, USD
Low-income < 1,005
Lower-middle income 1,006 - 3,955
Upper-middle income 3,956 - 12,235
High-income   > 12,235
The WB uses categories mainly for defining its lending policies for groups of 
countries, but income-category of a country is not the only factor used that in-
fluence lending decisions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) uses a differ-
ent classification of countries, based on income level and institutional aspects:
Table 2/2
IMF classification of member states
Advanced Economies
   Euro Area
   Major Advanced Economies (G7)
   Other Advanced Economies (excluding G7 and Euro Area)
   European Union
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
   Commonwealth of Independent States
   Emerging and Developing Asia
   ASEAN-5
   Emerging and Developing Europe
   Latin America and the Caribbean
   Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
   Middle East and North Africa
   Sub-Saharan Africa
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Under this classification, not all European countries are registered as ad-
vanced even if they are member states of the Union. The set of advanced 
countries under the 2017 dataset is the following.
Table 2/3
Advanced countries, IMF definition
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong SAR
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao SAR
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Puerto Rico
San Marino
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan Province of 
China
United Kingdom
United States
What may surprise you is that Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and 
some other European counties are classified as emerging and developing na-
tions. A section of their lists highlights the varieties of nation in alphabetic order 
around Hungary: Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan.2
Whatever is the official nomenclature in an international financial institution 
or in an international body such as the United Nations, analysts rather look at 
key indicators to form a high level picture of the economy: per capita income, 
inflation rate, employment (and unemployment) rate, public sector debt, cur-
rent and capital account, trade figures. For a finer comparison, even the shape 
of the business cycle of the economies concerned should be taken into ac-
count: unemployment rates tend to be high in recession time, but if such an 
episode is followed by upswing in economic activity, employment must im-
prove. A country’s labour market situation may be judged good or bad taking 
into account the cyclical position of the economy and the longer term trends. 
What also makes international comparison hard is the structure of the 
economies compared. Natural resource-rich nations, for instance, may dif-
2 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/groups.htm
40 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD: ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
fer too much from labour-rich countries to allow a reasonable comparison. 
Some economies are dependent on a few key commodities as Russia, certain 
Middle-East countries, Venezuela, and even Norway on crude oil, Australia, 
Canada, and some Latin American economies on minerals or agricultural prod-
ucts (cocoa, coffee, grain). The evaluation of their economic performance is 
much influenced by the global price situation of these commodities. Let us 
take Russia: its economic data look differently within a time span of a few 
years depending on the crude oil price being 120 USD per barrel (like in 2013) 
or just 40 USD per barrel (2017). In contrast, diversified economies where the 
majority of jobs are in the service sector and industry, rather than in primary 
sectors (agriculture and mining), business cycle tends to be less volatile. 
It is therefore not an easy or obvious task to identify countries that could be 
used as natural comparers for economic policy analysis; they cannot be cho-
sen subjectively, but subjective elements cannot be excluded either. People 
have ideas, not always supported by hard facts – but they are voters, and as 
voters, their views carry weight with the political class. Voters can force their 
preferences on the body politic at election times. People tend to regard well-
off neighbours as a benchmark. In Central and Eastern Europe, you would 
mostly compare your salary to those of working in Germany or Austria. This 
is natural inasmuch the nations concerned are close geographically and also 
culturally as they had lived under common ruler (Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) 
in previous historical periods, and still have a lot in common in lifestyle and life 
expectations. Hence another general statement that you must keep in mind: 
History matters. 
2.2 NATIONAL COMPARISON AS PART OF NATIONAL 
COMPETITION
Comparing macroeconomic achievements and macro imbalances across 
nations is a hard professional task, even if the countries concerned are close 
enough in terms of level of development, country size and geographical lo-
cation. It is even harder to compare a third world country’s economic policy 
situation and policy options to those of a highly monetized, advanced, and 
diversified economy. The difficulties of comparing very distinct cases are ex-
acerbated by concerns about statistical reliability: statistical services in less 
developed countries are sometime underfunded and not autonomous enough 
to generate timely and reliable data.   
What is also important to know: regimes differ. Socio-economic differences 
in structures and institutional orders matter critically in making account of per-
formance: a command economy (Cuba or North Korea) behaves very different-
ly from a fully-fledged market economy. Complications abound: in non-market, 
managed economies most of the economic transactions are conducted within 
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the government sector and therefore the statistics are sparse and less reliable 
than in a market-based economy. This is partly an issue of data quality and 
availability: non-democratic regimes without a free press, political opposition 
parties and civil society actors do not tend to be transparent. 
On top of that, there is a calculability issue: how to measure the true costs 
and output of a bureaucratic economic system – as was the case with Soviet 
type central planning – that applies arbitrary price and cost statistics, gener-
ated by some obscure government offices. Since plan fulfillment is vital for 
economic agents under a planned regime, functionaries at state-owned firms 
are tempted to over-report output systematically. Without goods and factor 
markets (that is, markets for labour, land, and capital) it is impossible to deter-
mine the proper exchange value of the products produced. As a consequence, 
some unwanted and substandard products will go down to statistics as per-
fectly fit for use – even if they are not. For calculating output of an economy 
producing more than one simple product, one needs prices, and they should 
be rational or real, rather than ad hoc. Planned economies did not use a flexible 
price system: the allocation of resources was conducted within the planning 
process, through bureaucratic bargaining and direct political dictat. Therefore, 
one should handle production, income, trade and price statistics of command 
economies with particular care, knowing that they are not directly comparable 
with data generated in market economies.3
Similarly, it is hard to compare recent data of the same country with statis-
tics collected in its command economy period: official data published before 
the regime change are far from reliable. For these reasons, official statistics 
of non-democratic regimes are not to be trusted automatically; it is recom-
mended to consult external sources such as the IMF/World Bank data or the 
CIA factbook. 
2.3 WHO NEEDS RELIABLE DATA?
Basic indicators of economic performance such as GDP, GNI (gross national 
income), GNP (gross national product) provide bird’s eye view of an economy. 
Still planners, analysts, and forecasters use them customarily. The most known 
income statistics is GDP, compiled and disseminated quarterly and annually, 
by national statistical authorities. Such agencies function under various names: 
Statistical Office, Statistical Bureau, Statistical Service. 
3 People’s Republic of China may be seen as market economy – others still regard 
it a command economy that behaves in international markets as if it were a mar-
ket-based system. Whatever China’s classification, its macroeconomic figures are 
widely seen as of questionable quality. 
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GDP is knowingly an imperfect but customary measure of economic 
performance
GDP data of a country are computed by making use of three ap-
proaches: counting production, final uses, and income. The reason is 
that observation of all the transactions and various changes in stocks 
(net wealth) is not easy in a living society: statisticians try to put togeth-
er puzzle pieces to arrive at a good approximation of economic per-
formance of the given country. The whole concept of GDP and similar 
macroeconomic performance measures may sound artificial, rigid and 
even somewhat suspicious for the laymen – and not without reason. 
Data collected are broken into given sectors (government, corpora-
tions, households, rest of the world), following internationally accepted 
definitions and standards, partly to make international comparison fea-
sible. Certain shortcomings of the GDP are well known: some activities 
are hard to measure with certainty. Also, data do not fully reflect the 
reproduction of the most important factor of production, that is human 
skills and capital, for the reason that there are no regular market trans-
actions of knowledge at market prices. Similarly, there are free goods 
(air, seawater, sunshine, rain) that are critically important for well-being, 
but lack reliable valuation: you cannot name the owner of fish stock of 
the sea. If a resource becomes obviously limited and has thus a mar-
ket, then the value will be reported to statisticians (the use of air is not 
reported, but as CO2 emission has gained a quota value, it is valued 
statistically). Note that national income statistics are based on counting 
market output for final use.
While data theoretically include paid household services, goods con-
sumed within the household, in-house investments of corporations, 
construction of dwelling by own efforts, even imputed rent of your own 
home are not measured as the same way as goods produced for sale. 
There exist various non-observed economic (illegal and partly legal) ac-
tivities. Income from prostitution, drug dealing, smuggling (there is a 
sizable black market of smuggled tobacco in many countries) are hard 
to be reflected in official statistics.4
4 Well trained economists would never take GDP for quality of life indicator or any 
close approximation of social advancement. GDP is just a generally used meas-
urement of market-based transactions within the National Accounts logic. Efforts 
have been made to enlarge the concept of GDP (see the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitussi Report), 
others instead built purpose-made indicators such as OECD’s Better Life Index or 
Genuine Progress Indicator and Human Development Index compiled by the United 
Nations.
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National output whether measured through GDP or other national income 
statistics is a politically sensitive indicator. As a variable, is has an influence 
on how businesses and the general public tends to judge the government, 
and the general heath of a country. When news agencies publish the latest 
data (even of preliminary, not final, classification) of major economies, stock 
exchanges react immediately. 
Data on labour market – a set of indicators monitored and collected by na-
tional statistical services under their own survey methods, as well as following 
the recommendations of a UN agency – may have an instant impact on finan-
cial markets. The publication of a report about, say, an unexpected increase of 
American employment may immediately make analysts believe that the US mon-
etary authorities become worried about and overheated economy, and the FED 
might resort to interest rate increase soon. Rate increase, in turn, will influence 
exchange rates, bond yields, and a vast number of other economic variables. 
One should be familiar with the terms used in policy debates, and employ-
ment issue is no exception. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) con-
siders people of working age to be in one (and one only) of three situations 
in the labour market: employed, unemployed, or inactive. The employed and 
unemployed together are considered as the two components of the labour 
force. Most people have heard about the unemployment rate but many do not 
know its content and real significance. Unemployment rate is the number of 
unemployed as a percentage of the labour force – that is measured against 
the sum of those who work and those who are regarded unemployed. Laymen 
again may find it strange that the unemployed are part of labour force – but 
they are, with reason. The unemployment rate tracks what economists call “la-
bour slack”: the never perfect match between the jobs on offer in an economy 
and the number of people seeking to work – and unemployed are those who 
actively seek employment but have not found yet. Labour data are frequently 
broken down for specific policy purposes: by economic sector, by occupation, 
by level of education, differentiating full- and part-time workers, short- and 
long-term unemployed.
Price level is a similarly sensitive indicator. Inflation is a bad news. Most 
people are aware of its meaning, and could name consumer price index as 
its measure. But economic reality is more complex again: there are various 
types of prices in an economy and therefore various measures, too.  Consumer 
price index or retail price index obviously measures changes in prices that we, 
consumers, pay for our goods. But what sort of goods? Bread is, naturally, a 
retail good and its price must appear in any meaningful price-level index. But 
what about your monthly mortgage bill?5 Differences between various compo-
5 The latter can be many times larger than your expenditure on bread. Not surpris-
ingly, the British Office for National Statistics (ONS) included mortgage bills into its 
measure of inflation called retail prices index (RPI) made public since 1957. But the 
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sitions of “representative sample” of goods and services can generate serious 
discrepancies of various inflation indexes; this is why international efforts have 
been made to unify calculation methodology. 
EU member states prepare and publish the so-called Harmonized Consumer 
Price Index (HCPI). It measures the change in the cost of a representative sam-
ple of retail goods and services under a harmonized method. 
Central banks, however, need other inflation indicators, too. Monetary policy 
makers need to know about the changes of producers’ prices, or export prices, 
for analytic reasons. They also use price indexes that factor out the impact of 
sales tax increases, which is logical: if shop prices this January are higher just 
because of a sales tax hike, this will rearrange income relations between the 
state and the citizen, making the latter worse off, and the Treasury better off, 
but higher prices do not mean that the purchasing value of money has de-
clined. Similarly, if crude oil prices shoot up, they will increase the general price 
level for some time, but this sort of price rise is different in nature from a proper 
inflation when most prices increase, and thus a unit of the currency (say: hun-
dred EUR) would buy you less of your customary set of goods and services. 
With these considerations, central banks make regular use of indexes of core 
inflation, that is indexes excluding transitory price changes such as prices of 
non processed foodstuff, household energy, subsidized medicine, and state 
controlled utility prices. 
State controlled or state managed prices are still with us even in modern 
mixed economies. Prices of certain services such as mass transport (railways, 
urban bus service) and some utilities may be controlled by national authorities. 
One may justify such a direct state intervention by market structure situation: 
lack of vigorous market competition among many providers gives the govern-
ment a reason (or sometimes an excuse) to set prices. Managed price does 
not necessary means that the price of the service/good is actually set by an 
agency: government influence over pricing may take indirect forms, too. Still 
the fact that the state has an influence over the pricing of a slice of national 
consumption means that the government may use its competences for po-
litical purposes, too (one cannot frequently experience high price increase of 
state controlled activities just before elections...).
Countries also differ a lot in terms of the importance of finance and banking 
in the national economy. One may assume that all nations, at least the market 
economies above a certain advancement level, must have a large banking, 
insurance and financial services sector, and they all have stock exchanges and 
statistical mainstream disregards interest payments in calculating the price changes 
of products and services sold and bought, this item is not part of the internation-
ally accepted definition of inflation. As the RPI was found not to meet international 
statistical standards, since 2013 the ONS uses, like all other EU member states, CPI 
statistics.
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capital market institutions such as brokerage firms, private equity funds. This 
assumption is mostly valid but some countries are known for the outstanding 
importance of their banking and capital market activities (Luxemburg, Cyprus, 
and Hong Kong) while other nations albeit they are highly advanced (Germany, 
for example) register a much smaller share of the output of the banking sector 
within the overall national output. 
This above issue is known as variations in financial depth. The concept of 
financial depth captures the size and advancement of the financial sector rela-
tive to the economy. It is conventionally measured by the asset size of banks 
and other financial institutions, by trade volumes of the financial markets in 
a country, all summed up and compared to national income. You may also 
use stock of private credit relative to GDP as an indicator for financial depth. 
Private credit is defined as bank credit issued to households, firms, NGOs 
(but does not cover loans to government agencies and public enterprises, nor 
credit issued by central banks). A broader measure is total banking assets to 
GDP, a more comprehensive measure of the importance of monetary activities, 
as it includes not only credit to the private sector, but also credit to govern-
ment as well as bank assets other than credit. 
Banking assets measured against GDP differ widely across countries, and 
this ratio correlates strongly with income level. For example, private credit to 
GDP in high-income countries is 103 percent, more than 4 times the average 
ratio in low-income countries. Economies with deep financial systems include 
many European countries, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. China’s finan-
cial system is also in the highest quartile in terms of this measure, higher than 
the United States’ depth. This interesting fact reflects two developments: one 
is China’s huge banking sector and the decades of dynamic growth of bank 
credit in People’s Republic of China, and second, the more market-based na-
ture of the U.S. financial system: stock exchanges and other capital market 
institutions are more important in the US in allocating financial assets than are 
commercial banks.  
For financial markets, a good approximation of the size of stock markets 
is stock market capitalization to GDP. For bond markets, a commonly used 
proxy for size is the outstanding volume of private debt securities to GDP. The 
sum of these two provides a rough indication of the relative size of the financial 
markets in a given country. 
There are huge international variations in financial depth that is in the rela-
tive importance of banking and finance in the given economy. Averaging over 
1980–2010, private credit of financial institutions was less than 10 percent of 
GDP in developing countries such as Angola, Cambodia, and Yemen, while ex-
ceeding 85 percent of GDP in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For 
financial markets, mean value of stock value traded was about 29 percent of 
GDP globally. In Armenia, Tanzania, and Uruguay, stock value traded annually 
averaged less than 0.23 percent over the 1980-2008 – that is the importance 
of stock exchange in these countries over the given period has been marginal 
or nil (not surprising in the case of Armenia, a onetime member republic of 
the then Soviet Union where stock exchanges were summarily abolished). In 
contrast, stock value traded averaged over 75 percent in China (both Mainland 
and Hong Kong), and in the United States.6
For aggregate and national data, you may wish to consult the Little Data Book 
on Financial Development (well, over 200 pages...), a publication of the World 
Bank Group. See below a snapshot of the globe from financial deepening aspect. 
Table 2/4
Evolution of financial depth and access to financial sector in the world
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22553/9781464805547.pdf
For contrast, let us see the data of advanced (high income) countries where 
over a billion people live. 
6 http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/background/financial-depth
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Table 2/5
Financial data of high income countries
As you see, most adults must have at least one bank account, about half of 
the firms (small firms included) make use of bank loans to finance investment 
or working capital. Stock markets are sizable even measured against the high 
national income; but in 2013 they were less sizable than in 2008 – one year 
before the financial crisis hit markets in earnest. The stock of private credit is 
as high on average as the value of an annual national income. (Take note that 
stock amount is measured to flow variable – we do it regularly even if the logic 
behind it is not obvious.)   
Non-professionals do not frequently discuss figures of balance of payment, 
unless the given country happens to be at the verge of international financial 
crisis due to an unsustainably high balance of payment deficit. The balance 
of international payments (abbreviated BoP) contains all economic transac-
tions between the residents of the country and the rest of the world (RoW) in a 
particular period, commonly a quarter of a year or a year. Transactions include 
payments for the country’s exports and imports of goods and services (this is 
the trade balance) as well as financial capital movements, and financial trans-
fers. When all components are included, their sum must show technically zero. 
Should the given country import more than it exports, its trade balance will be 
in deficit, but the shortfall is counterbalanced in some ways: through funds 
earned from its foreign investments or by depleting the country’s international 
reserves (kept at the central bank) or by receiving loans from the RoW.
2.4 INFORMATION IS POWER – BAD INFO IS A 
WEAKNESS
The above short overview has exposed just a slice of what data and knowl-
edge is needed for policymakers. Mention must be made of budgetary figures 
such as taxes generated, budgetary outlays, budget deficit/surplus and na-
tional debt. We will discuss these aspects of policy-making, being at the heart 
of politics as such. 
It is also good to know how market agents feel about their situations and 
outlook. Sentiment indicators are based on surveys consisting of a few ques-
tions aiming at the respondents’ opinions about their current and future busi-
ness conditions, current and planned employment activities, investment plans, 
and their general business expectations. Sentiments are rather subjective but 
the surveys deal with the present and the future – a big contrast with all the 
previous statistics that register the past. Leading indicators are therefore very 
important for the strategy maker. Major leading indicators include reports on 
the order books of firms for durable goods, orders for plant and equipment, 
new housing starts. Recent change in raw material prices can also be seen 
as a sort of leading (rather than lagging) indicator: a continued increase of 
metal prices may mirror pick-up in orders of producers who forecast growing 
demand for their products. Share price movements, business formation and 
failures data are also indicative of changes in sentiments (read: plans) in the 
business life.7
Are these data reliable? Data quality is always an issue. But so is timeliness. 
For a strategy maker, exact but late statistics is practically useless. A prelimi-
nary figure that will be later finalized and somewhat modified has a value for 
the decision maker who cannot wait much for the very final figure. But unreli-
able or incorrect data may lead to very costly policy mistakes. 
Quality is partly a technical issue, but also an institutional one. Independent 
data providers such as non-governmental statistical services, market research 
firms and polling firms are relatively free from political interference. Since the 
most data that economic policy makers use are products of national statistical 
offices (NSOs), it is imperative that such offices should be independent from 
political control, and be free of any political interference that could influence 
their work and their results. 
7 Read more: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/leading-indicators.html
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This is not always the case, not even in the European Union: the Greek gov-
ernment famously cheated with official statistics to get into the eurozone. Or, 
as the OECD, an international institution of which Greece is a member, care-
fully put: “eleven countries were initially chosen to enter the monetary Union on 
1 January 1999 while the assessment for Greece was postponed until 2001. In 
2001 Greece too was allowed to take part in the Monetary Union, although in 
2004 it became clear that the statistics relating to Greece’s deficit and public 
debt supplied by the Greek statistical authorities, validated by Eurostat and 
used as the basis for the decision by the European Council, were not accurate. 
In particular, based on the revised data, the public deficit/GDP ratio turned 
out to be well above the maximum 3% threshold established for accession to 
the monetary Union” (OECD, Understanding Economic Statistics, 2008). Later 
even worse cheating committed by the Greek statistical service under pres-
sure from the government came to light in 2011, leading further chaos and 
panic concerning the Greek financial situations. Greece is not a unique case. In 
the more explicit language of a weekly, The Economist just stated about official 
Argentinean statistics: “Since 2007 Argentina’s government has published in-
flation figures that almost nobody believes. These show prices as having risen 
by between 5% and 11% a year. Independent economists, provincial statistical 
offices and surveys of inflation expectations have all put the rate at more than 
double the official number” (Feb 25th 2012). 
All these pale in comparison to the situation in one-party non-democracies. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), a onetime major actor in global 
politics and a role model for some Third World countries, Western research-
ers and analyst had put lot of effort to determine the true capacities and the 
genuine economic health record of the USSR and other planned economies. 
Official Soviet statistics were notoriously unreliable; they tried to mislead and 
deceive the West (and probably the Soviet officials were also deceived in the 
process). A whole academic branch came to existence to understand various 
socio-economic systems, under the name of comparative economic systems. 
With the defeat of Communism as a serious alternative for nations in search of 
applicable modernization strategies, some thought that studies of non-market 
systems lost their policy significance. Yet, this is not fully so: the emergence of 
communist China or other non-Western type economic actors reminds us of 
the existence of systemic differences.
Use of statistics or any type of control information belongs to a general con-
text: the governance of the state. Non-market economies, military regimes or 
other types of controlled economies rely on information on the controlled – but 
public data are usually not up to high standards for data quality and statistical 
transparency. Analysts therefore must be aware of the variety of governance 
standards in our world. Business leaders know it well, even if instinctively. Do-
ing business in different parts of the globe can be very different. Government 
regulations across nations may differ a lot in the same sector. Nationalizations 
and heavy-handed government interventions are not at all practice of the past. 
Political risks, and particularly sovereign risks, do emerge as discussion top-
ics in corporate boardrooms. Comparison of policy conditions, governmental 
structures, socio-economic institutions therefore should be part of any major 
business strategy decision. 
What follows aims at preparing the reader for understanding the practice 
of national policy making practices that are so varied across nations, and the 
logic of such policy making processes that may turn out to be rather similar 
even under seemingly different political settings.  
Concept checks
financial depth of an economy – what it means and how to measure it
classification of countries by income
diversified versus mono-sector economy
(macroeconomic) governance
GDP, its significance and shortcomings
various measures of inflation
labour market statistics
balance of payment statistics
reliability of statistics  
independence of NSOs
End-of-chapter questions
What nation is a natural comparer for, say, Slovakia? (Yes, probably the right 
answer is the Czech Republic. Or perhaps Hungary, or Poland. Or for some, 
Germany.) Now something more complicated: what is the natural comparator 
for a US citizen? And for citizens of France? Of Britain? 
Produce arguments for or against independence of national statistical services. 
Germany has relatively smaller banking industry than Cyprus or Malta. Still 
the former is an advanced country. How come that high per capita income of 
Germany is not accompanied with high share of the financial sector? Second: 
could you guess why certain smaller nations (the mentioned two but also Lux-
emburg and some Channel island territories) are so eminent on the “financial 
depth” lists?  
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3.1 REMITS AND LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTS
Government activities are ubiquitous in our everyday life and in business. 
There are plenty of instances of public intervention ranging from health and 
safety regulations to construction permits, speed limits and cash payment lim-
its. A thoughtful reader, however, may immediately note here that while shop-
floor regulations, construction permits do belong to the domain of national, 
sub-national governments, yet business transactions are also strongly influ-
enced by transnational corporations, foreign banks, international financial insti-
tutions, that is, by global players. They are powerful global movers and shapers 
of the economy – beyond the direct control of any national government. 
Exchange rate movement, inward and outward capital flows, technology 
changes – these are sometime referred to as ’hard’ domain of the economy. 
These are certainly much influenced by global actors.8 Compared to that, what 
national governments do control are issues mostly belonging to the ’soft’ do-
main of economic life: social protection, education, labour market rules. A sin-
gle nation state is becoming simply too small to counter global market forces. 
Still, there are reasons to correct and soften the consequences of cross-border 
flows of goods, monies, ideas, and people – and the state can do a lot. But 
even with welfare and labour issues, global standards have gradually emerged, 
limiting the room of maneuver of any state.9 In higher education, for example, 
national governments are bound by intergovernmental agreements and multi-
national conventions; see the ’Bologna process’ of harmonizing higher educa-
tion structures in Europe.10
Do national governments still matter at all in ’hard’ economic issues? Does 
it make much difference what policy a national government aspires to follow 
in our ’global age’?
These are profound questions. If sovereignty of a nation state is a semi-empty 
legal concept, it is not really relevant in economic life, and of secondary impor-
tance for the wellbeing of a society, as economy is driven by global forces in 
contemporary border-free world economy, then this book should pay less atten-
tion to national governments. We should rather dwell on the goals and instru-
ments of important global players: the transnational (multinational) groups, mul-
tilateral financial institution (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
8 The global nature of economic life is most visible in finance, see e.g. Helleiner (1994)
9 Membership in the United Nations (UN) and  its agencies such as the ILO (Interna-
tional Labour Organization) places a member state under obligation to accept and 
follow norms regarding youth labour, female labour, health and safety standards. 
10 The Bologna accord aims at creating a European higher education area by mak-
ing degree standards and quality assurance norms comparable and compatible 
throughout Europe.  It is named after the Italian city of Bologna, where in 1999 the 
signing of the declaration by Ministers of Education from 29 European countries took 
place.
Bank). If… But the global financial turbulences of 2007–2009 suddenly changed 
the picture of the world as a playground of colossal global actors sidelining old-
fashioned nation states. In crisis, the states suddenly reinvent themselves. 
The strategic decisions taken by a number of national governments and cen-
tral banks testified to the virility of traditional economic policy activities. US, 
UK, France, and many other advanced countries aggressively increased public 
spending in order to boost aggregate demand. When domestic demand is 
weak and export markets shrink, governments step out to spend more: budg-
etary stimulus in the policy jargon. Central banks also tried to lend a helping 
hand to businesses by lowering central banking interest rates to nil or even 
below zero, and, if needed, took extraordinary monetary policy measures to 
help inject credit into the sluggish economy (“quantitative easing”).
What is noteworthy is not only that national governments become energet-
ic in times of turbulences, but economic policies also became much more 
varied across countries. This is one of the lessons of 2008: certain Western 
governments, as mentioned, did try to pull the economy from depression 
through government spending even at the price of accumulating big public 
sector debts; at the same time, some emerging economies followed a cautious 
course with balanced budget and high international reserves kept intact.11 In-
dia and China, two huge emerging economies, were still posting impressive 
economic growth figures, in sharp contrast to the US and the European Union 
suffering contraction during 2009. Within the European Union of 28 countries, 
the Polish economy, for example, fared better than Hungary or Slovakia during 
the recession year.
Chart 3/1
Growth rate in four Central Eastern European counties (the “Visegrad Four”)
11 The term emerging market refers to countries in the process of rapid modernization 
and economic growth, generally following policies of opening to international capital 
and goods markets.
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Take note of the surprisingly high growth rate of Slovakia, as well as of im-
pressive GDP growth in the Czech Republic and Poland, before the sudden 
end of “great moderation” in 2008. Also noteworthy is the variance within this 
given regional group of countries concerning their performance during the cri-
sis year of 2009 as well as a second, albeit much milder, slowdown/recession 
evolved in 2012.   
The recent economic downturn revealed how varied are economic condi-
tions even in one continent, and how significantly policy cures can differ in 
Europe. If the economic landscape is so complex even within a trading block, 
it is not surprising that the policy scene is so diverse on a global scale.
In our endeavor to understand the processes of economic policy making in 
changing international environment, we will look at the events and lessons of 
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis later in this book in detail. Let it suffice to 
state here that governments and government policies still do count. Economic 
life, true, is global, thus national borders cannot stop products and moneys 
from flowing across countries. Yet, national governments control a significant 
part of the economy, they exert influence not only on what we called soft fac-
tors of the economic life but also on hard aspects. 
The size and activity of national governments, as we have seen it in Chap-
ter 1, shows a surprisingly diversity around the globe. Thus it is very hard to 
venture any general statement about what governments can or cannot do in 
economic life. Countries differ by size, economic structure, level of develop-
ment, and political system. The Peoples’ Republic of China, for one, is a vast 
country with huge labour force, employed in large number at state owned en-
terprises (SOE), under a one-party system. Compare all these to a small open, 
parliamentary democracy like the Netherlands or Denmark. You have emerging 
market India, and a mature market economy like Japan, or the ’transition coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – vastly different cases. Yet they are 
all constituting parts of the global patchwork called world economy.
3.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND VARIATIONS
Throughout this book, our customary socio-economic context of policy-
making is multiparty parliamentary democracy and market economy. However, 
as references to communist China and former planned economies of CEE have 
already indicated: the so-called ’Western’ social model is not the only one. 
Market economy as it is known in Europe or the US is not universal, even if in 
our age the market model has no global competitor. While many people in the 
world do not share Western-type (‘capitalist’) values and institutions, oppo-
nents have not in fact offered a globally feasible alternative model of their own. 
That was not the case in the 1950s and 1960s with the Soviets whose regime 
had been built around a distinctive universal ideology („Marxism-Leninism”). 
Soviet communism claimed to be a world system, its leaders meant to export 
their values to the rest of the world. The Soviet regime disintegrated in the early 
1990s, the Soviet Union (USSR) does not exist anymore. Planned economy as 
an alternative to market economy has lost its broad appeal. Yet, some of its 
legacies are present; this is why we should study this economic system as a 
non-market way of organizing the economy. 
Market economy is a broad term. If you want to determine whether you live 
or not in such an economy, you will not get much help from textbook defini-
tions such as: „ it is an economy that allocates resources through the de-
centralized decisions of many firms and households as they interact in mar-
kets for goods and services”12. Decentralized decisions, markets for goods 
and services: these terms implicitly contrast market economy as an institution 
with planned economy, in which a central government determines the price of 
goods and services. Well, most readers have not probable ever seen a planned 
economy; there are few of them left anyway. But are modern market econo-
mies really decentralized? 
If you think of your daily shopping, you would say yes, of course. But hang 
on: the product you buy in a supermarket is probably a produce of a global 
food industry group, shipped to market by a giant logistics firm, advertized by 
one the dominant public relation groups – these multinational firms are known 
for their centralized decision making procedures. You think that you yourself 
take a decentralized decision as a shopper while placing the product into your 
cart. You are one of those hundreds of thousands of other shoppers buying the 
very same product in the same moment around the globe – shoppers who had 
been bombarded by the same product advertisement marketed globally. Let 
us face it: the meaning of ’decentralized’ in this context is ’non-governmental’, 
without implying a textbook case of “many firms and individuals competing on 
free markets”. 
What about, then, the concept of the ’market’? All existing societies have 
markets of one sort or another for exchanging products, with the probable 
exception of Communist North Korea unless you regard black market a sort of 
market. If, again, it is for daily shopping, vast majority of people of the Globe 
can be said to live in ‘market economies’, whose varieties range from Com-
munist Cuba to poor ’rogue state’ Somalia to super rich Luxemburg. These 
countries do not resemble each other much, certainly not in terms of sophisti-
cation, size, and efficiency of their markets. Thus, talking about proper market 
economy, one has to specify what sort (type) of economy it is.  
More markets, the better? Not so. In a modern and civilized market economy, 
not every product, service or good is exchanged through a market, legally. No 
market for drugs or for kidnapped businessmen, nor for stolen nuclear warheads 
– at least this is how it should be. To name less exotic products and services: 
12 Mankiw (1997), page 9
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military hardware in some societies is sold exclusively via a state-controlled sys-
tem; policing and justice are paid for and provided by the state, bypassing the 
market mechanisms. Social benefits like childcare allowances are transferred 
from public funds to eligible families under approved rules but without market-
like contract between the parties concerned. These examples shed some light 
on the social rules of exchange and on the redistributive functions of the state. 
The term market economy is sometimes used synonymously with free-mar-
ket economy – but the latter is rather shorthand for a model economy with no 
government control or heavy regulation. It would be hard to find a real econ-
omy comparable to that imaginary case. Most existing societies are mixed 
economies: markets coexist with government sectors of varying size. Govern-
ments across the globe regulate, to varying degrees, economic agents and 
economic transactions.
International comparisons reveal that countries differ a lot in terms of the 
relative size of the public sector, composition of public spending and the way 
the governments use their policy tools.13 A government may rely on sizea-
ble budgetary resources to correct what economists call ’market failures’.14 
Other states, referred to in literature as development states, spend significant 
amounts in order to accelerate growth and development via state investments, 
while other states leave more to market forces.
Big budget thus may mean many things: growth-supportive state, strength-
ening the competitiveness of the economy through structural policies. Big 
government budget can, equally, mean that politicians abuse their power by 
spending public monies on their pet project, or they just simply steal as much 
as they can. In the latter case, it is easy to see why lean governments are better. 
Interestingly, comparative studies show that there has been not much corre-
lation between relative size of government and economic growth. Similarly, the 
size of government does not strongly correlate with international competitive-
ness. This is not surprising. Generous public spending on, say, research and 
development or schooling is meant to improve productivity. In other cases, 
government expenditures do not add much to productivity. The impact of pub-
lic expenditures depends on the quality of policies and on the efficiency of the 
use of government sources. These issues, in turn, depend crucially on cultural, 
political and institutional factors such as attitude of the public to corruption, 
conditions of civic rights, social inclusion, the general value system of the so-
ciety (level of trust among citizens, for example).
13 See e.g. Tanzi (1995, 1997)
14 Market failure exists when the outcome of market activities is unsufficient, for in-
stance because of monopolies in the markets, or needed public goods are not pro-
duced in lack of business interest. Market failure cases do not automatically call for 
state interventions but government regulations (in case of monopolisation) and the 
use of taxes, subsidies and other incentives may well corrects market imperfections.
From the above it follows that sweeping statements about the nature of 
state (“governments just cannot do it well” – “government professionals must 
know it all”) or its relative size (“small state is beautiful”) are not to be trusted. 
The statement, however, that “the more developed a country, the more pub-
lic services it needs” was proven to be valid in an earlier period of economic 
development, first presented by a German economist Adolph Wagner. He 
gave his name to Wagner’s Law by making an observation first on German 
industrialization in the second half of the 19th century, namely that the share 
of the public sector tends to grow along with material progress. People, he 
claimed, expect more social activities from the state: more administrative and 
protective actions, and what we now call welfare functions. But, as always in 
economics, this is not a straightforward law but rather a tendency: success-
fully industrializing and densely populated countries tended to demand (and 
could afford) more public services than in their earlier phase of development or 
in poorer countries. There are numerous counterexamples, and therefore you 
must check facts and figures. There are many types and variations of govern-
ance structures of market economies; one cannot spare efforts to learn the 
factors behind successes and failures. A few models have emerged and have 
been tested in international economic competition. 
3.3 MAIN CONTEMPORARY MARKET ECONOMY 
MODELS – AND THEIR ECONOMIC POLICY STYLES
The many differences across country cases should not confuse us: in spite 
of the richness of varieties, there exist typical governance structures of mod-
ern states. Despite of distinct national characteristics, the developed world 
has produced a few types distinguishable by underlying structures of, first, 
government-labour-business relations and, second, the financial system. 
In the 1960s, the three main types were, according to a former classification: 
US-style market economy, continental European (welfare) states, and Japa-
nese ‘statism’ (Katzenstein, 1978). Others authors identified different types and 
used different names (for instance, the Japanese active state is sometimes 
discussed together with the French ‘étatism’ or even lumped together with 
Germany). For a start to understand the roots of present economic policy re-
gimes, this threesome is enough as a framework for discussion.15
15 Still, the cautions expressed by Nobel-Prize winner Edmund Phelps are in place: 
“Contrary to myth, what we commonly call the West is not polar with respect to the 
character of its economies, with the so-called “Anglo-Saxon” economies all oper-
ating on the system called capitalism, with or without an accompanying welfare 
state, and all the Continental economies operating on the system called corporatist, 
social-market or Rheinish. Denmark’s economy is thought to be different in some 
way and Italy’s is surely more industrious than most of the Anglo-Saxon economies. 
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Japan and the US are both nation states, each with a particular constitution, 
political climate and decision-making practice, while Europe is a continent of di-
versity offering parallels and comparisons for the student of economic policy-
making. This is an additional reason to analyze the European scene in more detail. 
As Phelps warns, there is not diametrical contrast between the so-called 
Anglo-Saxon (which is a bit old-fashioned term, or Anglo-American, mean-
ing the same) free market of the UK, Ireland on the one hand, and the Rhine 
capitalism represented by the economic system of France or Germany, on the 
other. Yet there certainly are structural differences between these systems. As 
for government relations to social partners, the Rhine version is strong on part-
nership with employers and unions. European continental finance is dominated 
by banks, rather than by capital markets (stock exchanges). 
This bank-versus-market difference has relevance for the macro-manage-
ment of the economy concerned. In a country, like Germany, banks (typically 
big, universal banks, sometime even in public ownership such as the Landes-
banks) entertain close relationships with companies, supplying them not only 
with short and medium term finance but with equity and long term funds, too, 
and thus they may become key stakeholders in industry and trade. Thus Ger-
man policy makers will always look carefully at the conditions of the bank-
ing sector – the main channel of savings to be transmitted into business and 
households. Banks are thus the parts of a power mechanism to keep indus-
try humming. Where the central institution of financial resource allocation is 
the stock exchange (like in the US), policymakers at the central bank (Fed) 
calibrate their monetary policy measures taking always into account the prob-
able consequences of those measures on the capital market in the first place; 
banks come second after the capital market in the order of significance. 
Economic policymakers in classical continental Europe take into account 
the views and positions of social partners. They know that the citizenry high-
ly regards the ideas of equality and solidarity. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon 
structure depends much less on corporatist interest mediation. Lobbyists, of 
course, are quite busy to influence lawmakers in their regulatory duties, but 
they are not part of a regulated political process, unlike trade unions and na-
tionwide federations (chambers) of employers in Germany or Sweden. 
In the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries (the term is outmoded but is still 
sometimes used) tax rates are generally lower, and the state redistributes a 
smaller share of the national income. This sort of market economy (capitalism) 
is supposed to be characterized by a less eminent role of the state in everyday 
life. However, data tell a somewhat less clear story: public spending in Britain 
does not amount to much smaller percentage of GDP then in Germany. It is the 
The Nordic nations, from Finland to Iceland, do not fit neatly into either category.” 
Phelps, 2006
subset of the Nordic countries, and also France, a West European nation, that 
have had traditionally big budgets, amounting to well over 50 per cent of GDP. 
At the same time, some Mediterranean countries, Ireland, and a number of 
new member states of the EU, have relatively small public sector, with public 
spending about 30 per cent of GDP. This figure is close to that of the US, the 
global benchmark for economic liberalism. Still, this statistic fact itself would 
not be enough to qualify Portugal or Romania as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ brand. 
Crisis times may necessitate expansionary economic policies, leading to high-
er relative share of the state – as in the case in Europe in year 2010 (see chart).
Chart 3/2
Increasing public spending, particularly during and after economic crisis
Source : https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN43%20Public%20Spending%202014.
pdf
The proportions of national budgets do change by time. The trend, if there ex-
ists at all, is upward: governments have become larger in time. But political trends 
also have their impact on the figures: the rather high British redistribution ratio 
peaked in 1980 before Margaret Thatcher became PM, and launched her efforts 
to cut back the bloated welfare state in the UK. Look at the chart and you will no-
tice Mrs Thatcher’s impact on UK redistribution ratio. Consecutive governments 
first followed the Thatcherite direction but not too long: soon big spenders took 
over. France, on the contrary, had mostly Socialist government at that time. The 
upward trend of public sector spending confirms the common political wisdom 
about left-leaning governments’ spending tendencies – though in certain cases 
Socialist/Social Democratic governments took painful corrective measures to roll 
back the State in order to regain competitiveness or to avoid fiscal troubles. 
The 2008 crisis, however, is different: whatever was the political colour of 
the government of the day, the authorities came to the rescue of the crisis-hit 
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economy and society. Voters welcomed increased public spending. But, as 
we will see it in a later chapter, the consequences of massive state borrowing 
can become frightening. As the economists love to remind the public, there is 
no free lunch: increased public spending places burden on the next genera-
tion – as long as you can borrow to renew and increase national debts and 
thus the debt issue is postponed. If, however, the state runs into difficulties in 
borrowing fresh money, it becomes hard or excessively expensive to renew old 
debt – that is what one calls financial crisis. The consequences are felt imme-
diately as soon as capital markets stop financing an over-indebted state. We 
will discuss later the options open to governments in times of crisis. What is 
enough to state here is that high public spending should never be associated 
automatically with social sensitivity or welfare orientation of the government of 
the day. Also one should keep in head a simple fact: for the state to spend and 
spend, taxes have to be collected or else public debt will be amassed. 
The changing trends of debt ratio underline the views that countries should 
not be mechanically classified under one or another market economy type 
by simple looking at size of deficits and debts. Most modern countries have 
a mixed economy: the private sector coexists with a state sector – and the 
proportion of this mixture may vary a lot across nations and in time. Most 
economically advanced nations live in societies one can call welfare state: 
there exist various protection and welfare schemes. Still, social policies very 
much differ in particular cases. Economic policy making in a given country is 
influenced by various factors: by the policy course of the government in office, 
the business cycle, external conditions, to name a few.
Social market economy: its origin and merits
The social market economy is frequently talked about without being 
properly defined. It emerged in its original form in Germany after the Sec-
ond World War (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) as a particular answer to the per-
ceived dangers caused by, on the one hand, American type of monopo-
lization and rule of big business, and emergence of centralized planned 
economy, on the other. Its theorists (Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken) and 
practitioners (Ludwig Erhard, Konrad Adenauer) believed that a business 
sector consisting of  small and medium sized firms is the best provider 
of jobs and a source of dynamism – under condition that the government 
creates a proper legal environment for employment and for healthy com-
petition, and also maintains price stability and balanced budget. 
If that sounds economic liberalism with fiscal conservatism, then is 
no mistake here. This school of thought can be classified also as ordo-
liberal, expecting the government to stay away from monetary policy 
activism and to leave interest rate setting to the independent central 
bank strongly committed to monetary stability – the Bundesbank, the 
conservative German central bank, a model for many national banks. 
Fiscal policy, the main policy domain of the government, should be ac-
tive in correcting market failures, and in countering the monopolization 
tendencies of the market economy, and it should heal the fragmenta-
tion of the society – yet, the budget should be balanced. What is par-
ticular under the social market model is an active income policy which 
involves collaboration with social partners (employers’ federation and 
trade unions), caring about proper wages, reduced inflation and main-
taining international wage competitiveness.  
The concept of social market economy had changed a lot by the 1980s. 
Socio-political developments strengthened the welfare state tendencies 
in Western Europe (and to a lesser degree, the US), thus the meaning 
of the term ‘social’ moved close to ‘welfare’. In the original concept the 
term ‘social’ referred to work for all and involvment of the society in val-
ue-generating activity, as well as to forging bonds between the individual 
and the community. By now, most people would associate social market 
with extensive social protection – which was not in the original concept. 
The term itself appears in the constitution of, among others, Poland 
or in the 1989 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and there is an 
expressed commitment to that in the draft constitution of the EU.16 As 
a socio-economic model, it has lost some of its former features (inclu-
sion of centralized social partners into high level national decision mak-
ing, national structural policy to invigorate competition and to keep big 
companies under control) but it still remains a reference for societies at-
tempting harmonize pro-market competition policies with inclusive state 
activity in social issues (providing job incentives rather than to keep peo-
ple on welfare; supporting small and medium businesses).  
3.4 A SENSITIVE DECISION: CHOOSING THE 
CURRENCY REGIME 
Dealing with money is one of the most powerful policies of the modern state 
(the other being collecting taxes). For the general public, the term monetary 
policy sounds very technical, particular when central bankers talk about of 
money supply, referring to M0, M1, M2 – which has nothing to do with motor-
ways... But even the layman hears about changes of central banking rates, and 
react angrily (or happily) to depreciation/appreciation of the national currency 
against some important other currencies. 
16 Bod, 2005a
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Technicalities of monetary policy, such as the speed and measure of the 
“pass-through of policy rate increase on general interest rate level” or “con-
sequences of a change of compulsory reserve ratio in banks’ lending activity” 
sound perplexingly complex issues – and they really are. Few people must 
follow closely the drivers and impacts of these and similar policy activities that 
are routinely conducted by central banks. Still, they are so important in running 
modern economies that even fewer people can afford not to have a broad 
picture on the central (national) bank of their country.
Most, but interestingly not all, countries have nowadays a national bank of 
their own. Most modern national banks enjoy an independent status from the 
government of the day (an issue to be discussed here as being increasing dis-
puted worldwide). Before deliberating the arguments of for and against central 
banking independence, a more elementary question should be considered: 
shall the state in case have a currency of its own, in the first place?  
A century ago, the answer was obviously affirmative. A national currency 
was seen as an important feature of statehood just like as keeping an army, 
taxing the subjects, and running national infrastructures such as railways or 
later national airlines. This was true some decades ago but not in our era. 
Some countries can do well without national railways, and particularly without 
national airlines. Having armies is still generally a necessity with very few ex-
ceptions. But what about national currency? Well, France and Germany, just 
to name two major countries, have no national currency of their own. They 
are both members of a currency area, along with several other small and big 
European nations: using euro. This is not a unique story: there are much fewer 
currencies globally than independent countries. 
Chart 3/3
Currencies in the EU, 2017
As always, history may help to understand the present. Skipping the intrigu-
ing chapters of the story of money (and power) of Europe, it is enough here to 
go back in time to the global gold standard regime. This lasted from about the 
1860s to 1914, the outbreak of the Great War when it had to be suspended 
for lack of preconditions of its proper functioning. Efforts were made to restore 
the gold standard after the war, but the Great Depression finally killed it again 
in 1931, and this time for good. You may say it is a pity that the gold standard 
is over as it certainly was a successful period in the history of mankind in the 
eyes of traders and businesspersons: major states backed their currencies by 
physical amounts of gold, making the national currencies strong and stable. 
What is more: it was designed to be transparent and stable. Under the in-
ternational gold standard regime, a fixed amount of gold was behind currency 
A (say, 6 gram of fine gold minted in a one-pound sterling coin), and another 
fixed amount of gold backed currency B and C (1.3 g with US dollar, and 0.3 
with French franc). Fixed gold content assured that businesses did not have 
to worry about changes in exchange rates: gold contents determined not only 
the theoretic value of each constituent currency of the gold system but their 
market value as well. Being part of the global gold currency system required 
the participating nation’s government to give up the right to change the value 
(the gold content) of the currency: there exists no appreciation or debasement 
of the currency as long as it is part of the gold standard regime. 
After the collapse of the boom times, the world experienced the Great Crash. 
It had deep economic consequences, but also contributed during the difficult in-
terwar years to the emergence of aggressive nationalism and totalitarianism. The 
gold system collapsed together with the concept of concerted international ef-
forts to run a global financial regime. What came after that, in the interwar years, 
is a period of no-system. Currencies were only nominally expressed in terms of 
gold content, but were in fact rarely underpinned by gold reserves in the vaults of 
the central (national) banks. Thus, their actual exchange rates fluctuated against 
other currencies driven by supply and demand conditions – meaning that busi-
ness agents ran exchange risk while having claims or obligations in other curren-
cies: the value of one given currency unit against another unit may have changed 
a lot by the time of the settlement of the transaction. Governments not only did 
not do their best to guarantee the relatively stable value of their currency, some 
even waged an economic war on others by aggressively devaluing their curren-
cies to gain (a temporary) competitive edge against neighbours. They would soon 
retaliate, by joining the devaluation race. Obviously, such circumstances were 
not conducive to international trade, already in tatters during war times. 
Having learnt the sad lessons, nations on the winning side decided as the 
end of the Second World War was approaching to create a new regime. Lead 
by two great trading nations of the era, the United States and Great Britain, 
the winning coalition, initiated an international conference to build a new, and 
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lasting financial system. That system is called now the Bretton Woods arrange-
ment, named after the New Hampshire, US resort where delegations from 44 
countries met in July 1944 for high level international negotiations. The talks 
resulted in certain international financial ground rules, and created two global 
institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or for short: World Bank). The US 
dollar was put into the centre of the Bretton Woods system, but national gov-
ernments retained the right to change (typically: depreciate) the value of their 
currency against the dollar and, as a consequence, against all other curren-
cies, after due consultation with the board of the IMF. 
Under the new, multilateral system, unilateral and aggressive devaluation 
thus became the thing of the past, and a professionally managed currency 
regime was introduced. It certainly functioned properly for decades. Yet, after 
some time, the system was tested by financial stresses and asymmetric eco-
nomic shocks. Eventually the original Bretton Woods system was replaced by 
a modified version after 1971 when most national currencies ended the fixed 
regime and started to float against each other. Still, the IMF and the World 
Bank, the other global institution conceived at that conference, do exist and 
active, with headquarters in Washington, DC (hence the frequent reference to 
the ‘Washington twins’), and serve as a forum for policy coordination, source 
of funds, as well as source of policy advice.
To-day, there are many varieties of exchange rate settlements but one may 
put particular cases into two big boxes. One subset consists of floating re-
gimes. Floating could take the form of free float and managed float. In the first 
case, monetary authorities of a country do not intervene in the value of the 
currency: exchange rate is determined at every moment of currency trading by 
supply and demand conditions. Managed float is the case when authorities ap-
ply some sort of intervention to shape the value of their currency against others.
But monetary authorities may decide that float involves too much of ex-
change rate risk, and managing is not enough to provide business and the 
general public the certainty of the value of the national currency – then what 
we have is a fixed currency. Keep in mind that you can fix your currency to only 
one currency, the so-called anchor currency which in most cases is a strong 
global money (USD, EUR or Yen). The authorities may peg their currencies to 
the currency of their important neighbour. But it just impossible to fix to all cur-
rencies since some of them float against others. 
Fixed regimes also come in many forms. A hard peg is a long term fixing: the 
fixer authority promises to sell and buy the currency against the anchor cur-
rency at a predetermined exchange rate in unlimited amount (posting a trader’s 
margin between the selling and purchasing rate is a normal practice and it still 
comes under the definition of being fixed). 
A particularly strong version of hard pegging (fixing) is called currency board: the 
authorities not only fix the domestic currency to another one but they also promise 
to keep as much anchor currency in their international reserves as the amount of 
the currency in circulation, to make sure that all holders of notes and coins could, 
if they wished, convert them to anchor currency (typically euro or dollar). Note that 
choosing a currency board system, the government assumes a sort of economic 
policy straitjacket: the government must keep money supply under strict control 
and avoid fiscal deficits lest it undermines the credible link to the anchor. 
You may ask why the state would not use the anchor currency altogether 
instead of fixing the exchange rate of the national currency: once a state gives 
up policy flexibility, it may go as well for the real thing, the strong international 
currency. There might be legal or political hurdles to do that, but some coun-
tries actually do that: it is called official dollarization. It has been practiced in 
some Latin American countries that simply do not bother to introduce and 
maintain a currency of your own but used US dollar as a legal tender.17
Monetary union is a particular version of fixing of currencies: nations that 
trade a lot with each other or are interconnected in other ways (politically and 
financially, or keeping international reserves at the same monetary institution 
like British colonies used to do that long time ago by commissioning the Bank 
of England to look after their reserves) may decide to form a union. There is a 
long history of such unions as was the case, for instance, with currency zone 
around the pound sterling, another with the French franc in the apex. Even af-
ter gaining independence, former colonies pegged their newly created curren-
cies to that of the former colonial empire; such arrangement lasted for several 
decades. While these unions have by now mostly disappeared, the eurozone 
is a reality, following a different historical trajectory, as we will discuss later.
Mention must be made of certain intermediate regimes such as floating 
within a predetermined band. Another in-between solution is crawling peg: the 
value of the domestic currency is pegged to an anchor but not for long: the 
currency is devalued regularly along a schedule.
The choice of having a national currency or not, and if yes the choice of a 
particular regime is an obligatory task for the state, a decision no government 
can dodge. It is not an easy decision, though, as any choice involves pluses 
and minuses. The arguments for a fixed regime is the stability of the exchange 
rate that it lends to the given country vis-à-vis the economy of the anchor 
country, or anyone else that use that world currency. This choice lowers risks 
for economic agents. Also, you will not “import” inflation through the exchange 
rate that could be the case under a floating and depreciating currency regime. 
17 Official dollarization presupposes an international agreement from the authorities of 
the anchor currency – an international legal and political issue. Spontaneous dollari-
zation, as we will see later, takes place regularly whenever a global currency (dollar 
or euro or any other major world currency) serves as an accepted means of payment 
in the daily life of a given economy without official blessing.    
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But there are buts: policy makers must accept the so-called ”impossible trin-
ity”: a state can only have two of the following three conditions: 1) monetary 
sovereignty in a sense that the central bank can set its interest rate freely; 2) 
exchange rate stability against the anchor; 3) full financial openness. Financial 
openness is a fact of life in our globalized world, particularly for small and large 
trade dependent nations accustomed to tremendous flows of goods and funds 
across borders. Governments may reintroduce import and export restrictions 
or capital control measures – but they mostly do it in crisis. Heavy control of 
the current and capital account needs a vast bureaucracy and places a burden 
on the economic life of the country. 
Therefore, there remain two real choices: give up exchange rate flexibility 
and keep interest rate sovereignty, or the other way around. The state may ei-
ther go for exchange rate stability by fixing the national currency for some time 
(‘fixed but adjustable’) or longer term (hard peg, currency board) or for eternity 
(giving up national currency or at least bringing it into a monetary union). Then, 
however, the central bank will be in no position to set policy rate at will: a lower 
rate than in the anchor economy would siphon out savings from your economy 
immediately, given that funds can flow easily in and out of economies – and 
they will flow out. The best, then, is to harmonize interest rates with those of 
the anchor nation. In another term: the national authorities will lose one influ-
ential policy instrument, setting interest rates at will. 
If one does not like it, go for floating. Then the regime will not face a sus-
tainability problem since there is no dedicated exchange rate to keep (and 
protect). But you get instead increased volatility in the currency markets: your 
currency may depreciate fast, making import suddenly more expensive, or at 
another time it may appreciate too much for the exporters who complain about 
losing price competitiveness. 
Floating can be a particular headache because of the herd behaviour of fi-
nancial markets: investors have a tendency to falling in love with one currency 
and buying it too heavily and then getting cold feet of it and dropping in an 
instance – that would lead to wild variation in exchange rate value. If the au-
thorities try to protect the currency by keeping domestic interests rates high, 
firms and banks and their retail clients will soon recognize that foreign markets 
offer lower interest rates – and domestic authorities cannot do much against it 
in open market regimes. Moreover, the governments may be the first to com-
mit the “original sin”: borrowing in currencies of others. Why is it a sin? To tap 
foreign capital markets in foreign currency may look a good idea since one can 
save in funding costs if interest rates are much lower in foreign markets. This 
is true – as long as domestic currency is stable or appreciates. But the country 
will incur big costs in case of a depreciation: debtors will have to buy foreign 
monies to service the debt at higher costs.
Currency stability and full convertibility are particularly crucial for nations 
that trade a lot – and it is understandable that a common currency zone was 
eventually established in Europe. The road to euro was not easy or fast. At 
that time of the signing of the Rome Treaty (1957), there was no mention of a 
common currency. The first time the idea was formulated was in the late 1960s 
when cross border trade and monetary flows grew fast (see the so-called 
Werner Plan of 1969). Yet, history took a turn: the (first) oil crisis exerted an 
asymmetric shock on the member states of the Common Market, and the idea 
of final fixing of currencies or of a currency zone had to be shelved. The most 
the participating nations could create was the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979 with an artificial composite currency named European Currency 
Unit (ECU) and a semi-fixed exchange rate mechanism (ERM). But efforts were 
made to reduce hurdles to trade and monetary flows across national borders, 
and attain capital market liberalization under the Single European Act (1986).
It was as late as in 1989 that the concept of the common currency was 
approved by the member states and its timetable was published under the 
Delors Plan (named after the then president of the European Commission). To 
put the plan to work, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) determined three phases: 
1) full capital account liberalisation; 2) establishment the European Monetary 
Institute as a germ for a European central bank; and 3) accomplish the mon-
etary and financial convergence process enabling the member states to give 
up national currencies and enter the common currency zone by January 1999. 
The process became, not surprisingly, highly political. The UK and later Den-
mark retained the right to stay outside the third phase (the actual common 
currency phase), and the Swedish government also decided to postpone the 
entry. New member states, the ten that joined in 2004, and others after that, 
had to accept to join the Euro zone, once they met the entry conditions. The 
map on Chart 3/3 shows how things stood in 2019.
The obvious theoretical advantages of being in the eurozone include decreas-
ing transaction costs, lower interest rates, larger monetary stability, and in-
creased policy credibility. There are obvious costs to recon with. Part of them are 
the technical costs (menu costs): all prices have to be denominated in the new 
currency, and due to rounding and the tricks of sellers, that may lead to a small 
one-off rise of prices. In reality, conversion to euro nowhere resulted in more 
than a half percent increase of the previous price level, still the general public 
tended to feel like a huge jump – an interesting psychological phenomenon. 
The real challenge (I would not call is a cost but a task) is to fulfill the conver-
gence criteria: bringing down inflation, reducing budget deficit and national debt. 
These are in the interest of the next generation but they place burden on the 
present government: measures to cut deficit and inflation are typically not popular. 
But the very real reason why some politicians resisted whether they admitted it or 
not is the loss of independent monetary policy (remember the impossible trinity). 
The common currency and the whole functioning of the EU requires the „sur-
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veillance and coordination of economic policies” on EU level as stated in many 
documents. The member states of the EU also agreed on preparing national 
stability programs (in case of eurozone members) and convergence programs 
(non-eurozone members). Should a member state violate the debt and deficit 
limits set by EU-level pacts, an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ will be triggered, 
with potential but a bit uncertain fine on the culprit.
The apex of the new monetary arrangement is the European Central Bank 
(ECB). This is a joint institution within the European System of the Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank (ESCB). ESCB technically consists of 
the ECB plus the national banks of the Euro zone member states. The docu-
ments state that the “primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability”. 
Mandates and limits of central banks
It is useful to compare and contrast the legal status and remits of 
various central banks. The most important such institution is the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of the United States (FED). Section 2a of the Federal 
Reserve Act states that: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain 
long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate 
with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, 
and moderate long-term interest rates”. Take note that the Act includes 
three, rather than one, goals: employment, stable prices, low interest 
rates – for, obviously, the American economy.  
In contrast, the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 
105 states that “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain 
price stability.” There is a single mandate for the ECB: to fight inflation. 
ECB is answerable to the European Parliament but not to any member 
state government or Parliament: it is perhaps the most independent 
monetary institution ever. 
Let us look at the law on a central bank of a member state still out-
side the eurozone. The Hungarian Act on Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB 
or Hungarian National Bank) determines that” (1) The primary objective 
of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain price stability. (2) Without 
prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB shall support the mainte-
nance of the stability of the system of financial intermediation, the en-
hancement of its resilience, its sustainable contribution to economic 
growth; furthermore, the MNB shall support the economic policy of the 
government using the instruments at its disposal.
The legal case is clear: this central bank is mandated first of all to at-
tain price stability any other activities can only come after that.  
Critics claim that central banks have too much independence from 
the governments, and also from the whole society. “Unelected bu-
reaucrats enjoy unchecked power” – goes the argument against full 
independence. Others remind us the terrible consequences of previous 
practices even in European countries when short-sighted politicians 
forced their will on the national banks and the process led to soaring 
inflation and sometime the collapse of the financial system. The gov-
ernments in some developing countries have also used the national 
banks as a cheap source to finance public sector deficit – with terrible 
consequences. This is a debate that is hard to settle; as one can see, 
legal and political conditions differ in different countries.
3.5 A CHAPTER MOSTLY CLOSED – CENTRALLY 
PLANNED ECONOMIES
Planned economies, particularly in their unreformed orthodox phase in the 
1950s, relied exclusively on non-market and non-monetary mechanisms to or-
ganize production and exchange. A central planning office, in the apex of the 
vast government bureaucracy to run a nationalized economy, was given the task 
to bring together supply and demand through material balances set in tons of 
steel, in square meters of textile, in pairs of shoes, etc. without market competi-
tion or flexible prices. This is a command economy: high level bureaucrats is-
suing orders for lower level executives, under a political system of hierarchically 
organized party-state. In the Soviet Union since the 1930s, factories had been 
in public ownership, and public institutions (planning office, sectoral ministries) 
had determined what and how much was to be produced, at what price to be 
allocated to whom. In such a system, planning authorities only needed money 
terms for aggregation purposes: top level authorities determined the main pro-
duction targets, and then broke down targets for lower level bureaucracies in 
the form of p×q, where q stands for physical quantities and p for (official) prices. 
Real life planned economies did not work exactly like the above model, con-
ceived as a totally closed, and perfectly controlled behemoth. State control 
could not be total, not even in the Soviet Union, and even less in the CEE coun-
tries that the Soviets later added to their sphere of interest after the Second 
World War. In spite of the efforts of the Soviets to force their socio-economic 
regime on the CEE regions, certain national varieties remained, partly due to 
differences in local conditions vis-a-vis Soviet Russia, and also due to the 
differences of the levels of advancement of the countries conquered by the 
Red Army during the Second World War. The Czech, east German territories, 
Hungary were much more developed than Albania or Bulgaria or Russia: these 
nations were brought under the same political command after the war, but 
national differences did not appear under the new regime. 
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The more developed the country was, Sovietisation and central planning 
seemed to work less. Not surprisingly. Soviet type bureaucratic top-down 
management was hopelessly rigid, inefficient, de-humanising. People soon 
learned the truth about the much-praised planned regime. Dissatisfaction with 
the Soviet regime first appeared in the more developed part of the conquered 
region: in Berlin (1953) and Poland and Hungary (1956). The Hungarian revolu-
tion and freedom fight was the most serious challenge to Soviet Communism – 
and was brutally crushed by Soviet tanks, but it became obvious for all – even 
for the communists themselves – that society regarded the communist rule 
illegitimate and alien, underpinned only be naked military power. The revolu-
tion was lost, but the rulers could not rule post-1956 Hungary the way they did 
before the revolution. Reforms were introduced gradually. 
At that time, in the region, there existed already one particular case, that 
of Yugoslavia, of a reformed version of communism with strong emphasis on 
workers’ self-management even if workers’ rule in reality meant only broad 
independence of company executives vis-à-vis far away bureaucrats. Reform 
initiatives appeared later in some other communist countries in the 1960s. 
Gradually two versions emerged: the “reformed” and the “orthodox” sub-sets 
of socialist/communist regimes; with Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary (and for a 
while, until the sad ending of the Prague Spring in 1968: Czechoslovakia) in the 
first, and Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, the GDR, the Soviet Union itself, in the 
second group. The latter group was characterised by micromanagement of the 
economy through physical planning until the very end.18
In the countries of the reformed version variety, such as Hungary and Yu-
goslavia, SOEs were granted operational autonomy, supply and demand was 
meant to be balanced through market-like (but mostly state determined) pric-
es, corporate managers were expected to find markets and sell products at 
profits: the system was publicly owned but resembled market economies in 
some respects. For a while, the reformed version in CEE countries seemed to 
work: progressive Western academics warmly praised the promising Hungar-
ian “New Economic Mechanism” of 1968. But by late 1970s, serious weak-
nesses had built up in the countries concerned: foreign trade deficit with the 
West and foreign indebtedness, inflationary tendencies, and reappearance of 
unemployment.  The reform process got halted or reversed as Communist 
rulers became worried about social stability, and took back some of the mana-
gerial freedoms from corporate executives, and restored more direct central 
intervention in the daily functioning of the economy. Soon, advocates of a re-
formed version of central planning had to admit that the effort to turn a man-
aged economy in a one-party, non-democratic state into a ’socialist market 
18 Gorbatshev’s Perestroika in mid-1980s was more of a public relation exercise rather 
than a profound reform.
economy’ simply did not work. Intellectuals started to realize that the nations 
of Central Eastern Europe should return to democratic rule of law and should 
open up economy to European (global) processes to modernize – as soon as 
geopolitical conditions allow such a breakthrough.  
For long time, such a breakthrough looked unlikely. Meanwhile, financial 
liberalisation in the ‘reform socialist’ period preceding the eventual system 
change led to much unwanted but very grave side-effects. As McKinnon put 
it: ”None of the (previously) socialist economies of Eastern Europe, China, and 
Vietnam have established sufficient financial equilibrium to support the desired 
marketization of their economies. Indeed, smaller Eastern European econo-
mies, such as Yugoslavia and Hungary, that have been struggling to create “so-
cialist market economies” for more than a decade are threatened with severe 
internal inflation and very large external debt.“19
All Eastern and Central European planned economies sank in political and eco-
nomic crises before and around 1990 (see later) which led to an abrupt regime 
change. Present day China, on the other hand, has become an emerging econ-
omy, literally emerging from a low level of technology and productivity into the 
position of an industrial power. The Chinese communist leadership decided not 
to follow the pattern of Russia’s regime change, instead they gradually developed 
a semi-market sector under one-party political control. Instead of privatizing 
SOEs, the leadership encouraged the development of a new, non-state sector of 
the economy alongside the state sector. The Chinese retain central planning: in-
dicative for the whole economy, effective for the state sector. The system leaves 
room for market forces in the non-state sector (which does not necessary means 
private sector – ownership rights can belong to local council or the collective of 
the workers). Private ownership, particularly in case of large and important firms, 
does not exactly mean the same in one-party illiberal regime as in the West: legal 
owners do not exercise their rights fully cut from political interference.   
The economic policy of China is distinctive: export-led growth in an econ-
omy with vast human and natural resources, where the state controls the 
commanding heights of the economy, practices active industrial policy. The 
exchange rate of the national currency is believed to be kept undervalued rela-
tive to the currencies of other nations, thus monetary policy also encourages 
export and discourages import. 
The historical retreat of Soviet-type and similarly ideology-based command 
regimes was mainly caused due to inferior competitiveness of such systems. 
The economic collapse of the Soviet Union closed a period in which central 
planning and public ownership was not simply an atypical version but a promise 
and model for some nations in search of a non-capitalist mode of production. 
So, it is over now. Yet, following the Western market models does not seem to 
19 McKinnon, 1991
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remain the only option in a world economy of such diversity; less developed 
nations may be tempted again to accelerate growth based on non-conventional 
economic policies and state-centred governance models of their own.                    
3.6 CONCLUSION
Industrial, social, monetary, and fiscal policies as well as other important fields 
of economic policy-making will be analyzed in the chapters that follow. At this 
junction, it is enough to state that structures of economies and varieties of systems 
and economic policy traditions differ in the world. Therefore, it is not enough to 
discuss policies and government measures in the abstract, since the seemingly 
same measure may lead to very different outcome due to structural differences.  
Globalization, it is true, has had a homogenizing effect on norms, rules and 
techniques of economic activities. Nation states have given up certain policy 
instruments of their own or passed them on global or regional institutions. Yet, 
states still matter. The reproduction of the human capital (health, education, 
social and family policies, regional development, science and culture) mostly 
belong to the domain of nation states. Global institutions and international 
conventions have had increasing influence on market-related aspects of eco-
nomic life: production, trade and finance. Yet, the economic structure and the 
institutional order of countries differ to significant degrees in our global era, in 
spite of trends of convergence in business life. In crises, national authorities 
are particularly active, as we will discuss soon.
Market-based economies dominate the scene, with a very few exceptions 
(remnants of former central planning regimes, failed states). But the concept 
and scope of markets differ a lot in the world. Market economy is a very broad 
term: its versions range from economic liberalism of Singapore to state-social-
istic Asian regimes to Nordic welfare states to crony-capitalist regimes. Thus 
the same economic policy tool will behave differently in different sub-systems. 
Concept checks
National sovereignty
Planned economy
State owned enterprise (SOE)
Market economy – and its varieties
Emerging market
Mixed economy
Anglo-Saxon capitalism
Rhine capitalism
Social market economy
Market failure
Wagner’s Law
Ordo-liberalism
independence of central banks
single and multiple mandate of central (national) banks
Reform-communism 
End-of-chapter questions
Investments, technology as ‘hard’ aspects, pension system and health care as 
‘soft’ aspects – do you agree with such distinctions?
“Central planners calculate the best possible output level of the economy, and 
thus they save a lot for the society by ending wasteful competition among pro-
ducers and traders.” Somehow, existing planned economies were character-
ized by shortages, overproduction, and quality problems. Why?
Companies plan their businesses and governments plan their budgets in a 
market economy. Why do not we call it ‘planned economy’?
“Big government means high taxes; high taxes mean costly production and 
poor international competitiveness.” Yet, Sweden has high taxation and a 
competitive industry. How come?
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4.1 THERE WAS NO TEXTBOOK TO GO BY WHEN 
SIMULTANEOUS SHOCKS HIT A DISINTEGRATING 
REGIME, AND NATIONS WANTED TO “RETURN TO 
EUROPE”
Macroeconomic management is a hard enough task even within an estab-
lished functioning (European type) market economy in times of external chang-
es (’shocks’) that suddenly cause market disruptions, or when imbalances 
gradually accumulate to a degree that macroeconomic stabilization efforts are 
needed. Yet, macroeconomic policy makers in advanced nations are not left 
alone in facing the challenges: they can build on a vast body of academic 
knowledge and on received wisdom about good policies, and have immense 
material resources at their disposal to be mobilized. Governments can count 
on business dynamism and entrepreneurship, on the services of the financial 
sector, and on the skills of the civil service at their disposal. Social conflicts 
(strikes, demonstrations) are still common phenomena in problem periods 
but they may be mitigated in a democracy and fully fledged market economy 
through interactions between trade unions and employers’ federation as social 
partners. Interest intermediation platforms (labour tribunals, independent bod-
ies and the courts) help channel unavoidable industrial frictions. In short: there 
are market institutions, market forces and public institutions that government 
officials responsible for the macroeconomic framework can put to work. 
This was not so in state run (managed or planned) economies. Centrally 
planned regimes of the 20th centuries (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, East Ger-
many, People’s Republic of Hungary, Czechoslovakia – to name various cases) 
were all trapped in a unique contradiction: they were all-important yet unaided 
states. The State (more precisely in communist countries: Party-State) seemed 
to be extremely powerful, as the Party-State owned most of the factories, farms 
and establishments, it controlled prices, wages, employment and income, pro-
vided pension and health services, its top leadership decided about invest-
ment projects, its vast bureaucracy licensed exporting and import activities.20
Where is the weakness, then? Well, in such a system no independent eco-
nomic and social agents exist: the state is not a part of the economy. It is the 
economy, except for the black economy, moonlighting, contraband, and other 
informal activities. Still, in spite of this tremendous power, the Communist state 
can hardly rely on the entrepreneurial spirit and creativity of economic agents 
– who are subordinates, and as such, they are trained, motivated and incen-
tivised to follow orders and execute directives. Thus they are discouraged to 
innovate, that is, to depart from the approved and sanctioned rule (“five year 
plan”). Given the lack of any approved autonomy of subordinates – and in an 
20 See e.g. Archie Brown (2009): The Rise and Fall of Communism. London.
extremely centralized regime all agents are subordinates –, top decision mak-
ers (the dictator and his associates) just cannot expect initiatives from below.  
Here the contrast is stark among different political-economic systems. In a 
market economy, a government’s stabilization policy implies influencing and 
channelling the behaviour of self-interested, active market agents through 
public policies that shape market sentiments and conditions. The modern 
state can purposefully manipulate policy instruments such as taxes, monetary 
signals, public expenditures, government regulations. In doing so, the authori-
ties will receive instant feedback from price movements of product and assets, 
from labour market changes, business cycle indicators, consumer surveys. 
In a planned economy, by contrast, where economy is nearly fully identical 
with the vast Party-State, stabilization efforts by authorities are supposed to 
change the functioning of the behemoth organisation of the State itself – an 
obviously self-contradictory task. 
We will not discuss here the challenges of making economic policy deci-
sions in a planned economy – an interesting topic in itself but something of a 
closed chapter in history. But the consequences of the party-state period had 
an impact on the transition process and are still being felt in former planned 
economies. Here we will look at the economic policy processes in so-called 
transition countries – or better: counties in system transformation. 
Our focus is the CEE region. Yet, systemic change is not at all a rare case. 
Far from it. In recent decades, dozens of countries have gone through socio-
economic transformations of various types, under very different geopolitical 
conditions: think of the fall of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the 
1970s and of military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, the breakup 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, fall of one-party rule in several African countries in 
the 1990s, regime change in Iraq and Libya.21
The causes, political conditions, and outcomes of these cases vary, yet you 
can identify one common characteristic: simultaneous nature of transforma-
tion, in two senses of the term. First, the changes take place not only in the po-
litical system (regime) but also in economic structure, legal and constitutional 
order, security alliance at the same time. Second: regime changes would typi-
cally spread regionally from one country to another within a set (e.g. the “tran-
sition of Eastern bloc” or the “Arab Spring”). Economic policy makers, under 
such conditions, must address numerous changes simultaneously, quickly, 
and in a hectic environment, and the policy choices of a given country are not 
independent from events in neighbourhood. 
To illustrate the task, below we will analyze the transition from a planned 
regime to a market based economic system in the former Soviet Union and in 
21 Carothers (2002): The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy
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Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Lessons learnt here may have relevance 
also for countries of different background being in the process of transit from 
one regime to another. 
4.2 WHAT’S IN A NAME?
At the start, let us comment on the name of the game. Change of the sys-
tem? Regime change? Reform? Transition? 
Transition has probably become the most commonly used term in professional 
literature and media, even if it does not express the complexity of the policy 
challenges. In the late 1980s, still in the optimistic phase of world politics, the 
term ‘transition’ seemed to suit the set of countries that were leaving behind the 
Soviet-type system. But some time later, the applicability the term suggesting a 
unilinear movement from one state to a given state was seriously questioned.22
As for the term regime change: recently it has been used to involve the over-
throw of a government, as was the case of Iraq where Saddam Hussein’s op-
pressive and aggressive rule was ended by American military intervention.23 In 
contrast, the changes in socio-economic systems we are talking about have 
not involved use of military force or internal revolution. 
Sometimes the less dramatic term reform is applied to the transformation of 
regimes in Eastern Europe. The term reform, however, refers to gradual change, 
exercised by some central actors; gradual and piecemeal is not what you wish 
to use for the turbulent events that erupted after the collapse of communism.24
In the absence of a single suitable term for a phenomenon, one uses more. 
Throughout this book the terms ‘transition’ and ‘regime change’ and ‘change 
of regime/system’ will be used interchangeable for a systemic transformation 
22 Carothers (2002) discusses the issue in detail.
23 C.f. Wikiepedia on the term: „Regime change can be used in a euphemistic sense to 
describe the unilateral imposition of one nation’s will onto another through military 
force. In mass media the term is often associated with measures imposed by exter-
nal forces rather than internal revolutions and coups.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Regime_change. Downloaded: 2010-01-21. And a later definition: Regime change 
is the replacement of one government regime with another. Regime change may 
replace all or part of the state’s most critical leadership system, administrative appa-
ratus, or bureaucracy. It can be the deliberate product of outside force, as in warfare. 
Regime change can occur through inside change caused by revolution, coup d’état 
or reconstruction following the failure of a state. 2016-08-20
24 The title of an otherwise very interesting book on decision making and decision mak-
ers in the context of the regime change of Central-Eastern European countries is a 
good example for the use of misnomers: M.I.Blejer - F. Coricelli (1995): The Making 
of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe - Conversations with Leading Reformers in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995. These 
countries are not in Eastern Europe, the persons interviewed not simply ’reformers’ 
but active in regime change.
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of the social order and economic institutions, economic structures and be-
havioural rules. ‘Reform’ will thus mean reform, that is, a partial and peaceful 
change within the status quo. 
Whatever term we wish to use, the distinction between reform and overall 
regime/systemic change is clear. A reform, by definition evolutionary or partial, 
implies policy corrections and incremental changes. In contrast, regime change 
leads to a new socio-economic order of a nation. From economic policy point 
of view, there are huge differences between the former and the latter: during a 
reform period, one can apply conventional policy instruments such as change in 
fiscal stance of in monetary conditions, while in the latter case profound chang-
es take place in modus operandi of the given socio-economic regime. When a 
regime changes, a societal system stops functioning the old way, discontinuities 
arise in various areas of the society. Side effects may appear, causing deep ma-
terial losses and increased uncertainty, even provoking capital flight. Transition 
is typically hard on the people, even if the nation wins on the long run.  Decision 
makers also have a hard time as they cannot simply apply known policy recipes 
- for the reason that there exists no textbook to go by. 
What follows is the case of small European nations undergoing a simultane-
ous change in their political system, military alliance, foreign trade environ-
ment, ownership pattern, price system – to name the most important aspects 
of transition from planned regime to market based economy. 
4.3 SHOCK THERAPY OR/AND GRADUAL CHANGES
The transition process poses particular challenges for economic policy mak-
ers: they have to deal, first, with problems of macroeconomic nature such as a 
(transitional) output decline accompanied by sudden increase of unemployment, 
acceleration of inflation, and swell in budget deficit due to shrinkage of the tax 
base. In addition, structural difficulties may arise when, for instance, industrial 
(and perhaps regional) crises erupt due to discontinuation of external trade flows 
and bankruptcies of major firms. Third, politicians have to manage the very sensi-
tive processes of privatisation of the bloated public sector, and the legal conse-
quences of the return to the constitutional order: restitution and/or compensation 
for damages suffered previously under non-democratic regimes. 
The policy actions in CEE countries in transformation invariably include lib-
eralization of prices, wages, foreign trade activities, foreign exchange transac-
tions, entrepreneurial activities. These liberalization and deregulation actions 
are necessitated by the fact that the former regimes had maintained detailed 
state regulations in all areas of the economy. A high degree of government 
regulation is simply incompatible with the market economy. As a consequence 
of the above, governments in transition countries can only choose the speed of 
the liberalization process but they cannot choose not to liberalize at all. 
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A very fast liberalization has one big plus: it shortens the period of ambi-
guity about the “rules of the game”. On the other hand – and in economic 
policy there is always an “other hand” – instant removal of barriers may lead 
to unforeseen negative consequences. Unilateral opening up of the domestic 
market to imports and immediate liberalization of exports is meant to acceler-
ate the inclusion of the given country into the world economy which is a big 
plus after decades of semi-closeness. However, trade deficit can emerge very 
quickly as capacity to export is still limited but the propensity to import con-
sumer goods and industrial products is typically very high after the removal of 
restrictions and protective measures. Now, a policy maker can accept (tem-
porarily) a degree of trade deficit for the improvement of market supply con-
ditions and for creating a new playing field for the whole economy. A steep 
deterioration of the current account balance, however, becomes a major prob-
lem. Similarly, a full lift of price regulations may symbolize the new era and will 
be welcomed by market players but such a bold policy action can trigger an 
acceleration of inflation in the absence of effective market competition: firms 
in dominant market position can simply decide to increase prices under the 
new, control-free regime. Quantum leaps in the liberalization process thus may 
cause unpleasant surprises, and their consequences may elicit social opposi-
tion to the whole process. 
The speed of liberalization was varied in the practice of the CEE countries 
after the regime change in early 1990s, and not only because some govern-
ment proved to be bolder than others. Much depended on the initial conditions 
of the economies concerned. CEE countries entered the period of change in 
various economic starting positions.25
    
Table 4/1
Institutional Reform in Selected Transition Economies
Country
Initial 
conditions 
-10 to +10
Liberaliza-
tion index, 
1989 
0 to 100
Liberalization 
index, 1997 
0-to 100
Institutional 
qualities 
1997/1998
1-10
Bulgaria 2,1 13 79 0,1
Czech 
Republic 3,5 - 93 6,8
Hungary 3,3 34 93 8,7
Poland 1,9 24 89 7,0
25 The starting positions are hard to measure, yet based on indicators covering the role 
of prices, markets and structural and macroeconomic variables, an overall index was 
constructed at the UNECE. See: UNECE (2001) Economic Survey of Europe, No. 2
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Romania 1,7 - 75 -0,8
Slovakia 2,9 - 86 2,8
Slovenia 3,2 41 89 8,5
Estonia -0,4 7 93 6,1
Source: UN ECE (2001)26 The entry ‘initial conditions’ applies to successor countries under the   
present status quo.
The Czech Republic (that is, the Czech part of the then Czechoslovakia) 
was estimated to have enjoyed the best starting position of all the countries 
assessed. The initial conditions in the other part of the same entity, the present 
Slovak Republic, were rated 2.9, that is much below that of Hungary (3.3). 
Slovakia’s conditions were still regarded better than those in Poland, an earlier 
reform-socialist country that got bogged down in deep socio-economic crisis 
in the 1980s with a bankrupt state that could not service its foreign debts, and 
with obsolete heavy industries; hence the low overall rating of Poland. In 1989, 
base year for comparison, Slovenia was still not independent, being at that 
time part of the bankrupt Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and, as such, this 
small sub-alpine country faced difficulties, yet otherwise its initial conditions 
were judged relatively good. A later “convergence star” Estonia was still under 
Soviet rule – hence the low rating of its initial conditions.
Let us note that while Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland had become rela-
tively (compared to other Communist-controlled countries of the region) liber-
alized in economic affairs by the 1980s, this fact did not automatically mean 
good overall initial conditions. According to the assessment quoted, Socialist 
Bulgaria still had better conditions than Socialist Poland, and in 1989 People’s 
Republic of Hungary was somewhat behind Czechoslovakia – the latter living 
under an orthodox political and economic regime after the collapse of the 1968 
Prague Spring up to the Velvet Revolution of 1989.27
Whatever the initial condition of the country, each government had to steer 
through muddy waters after 1990. There exist, again, professional assessment 
of relative ‘policy performance’ of these countries during the first decade, 
such those published by IMF economists (Fisher – Sahay, 2004). Obviously, 
some countries turned out more successful than others.  Certain governments 
managed to negotiate the most demanding early transition years with toler-
26 UN ECE (2001): op.cit.
27 The reform-socialist movement in early 1968 within the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party went too far for the ageing Soviet leaders and for some puzzled Communists 
in satellite countries: eventually a military intervention organized under the Warsaw 
Pact, the military alliance, put down the reform movement in August 1968, and 
planted a puppet government, loyal to Moscow, in Prague. Had reformers in Prague 
succeeded, that would have become the most profound shake-up of a bureaucratic 
and rigid non-market regime.   
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able budget deficit rate (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Hungary), 
and moderate inflation (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia), other suffered 
episodes of hyperinflation (e.g. Poland), and few could avoid high unemploy-
ment. On the whole, the policy performance of Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
perhaps Hungary could be rated positively under the customary IMF checklist, 
in the first decade of transition: not a surprising result given the tolerable initial 
conditions and political stability of those nations during that period. Still, in less 
obvious cases, other governments also “behaved well” for some years, that is, 
conducted textbook policies. Episodes of such “good behaviour” in hard times 
is not always due to exemplarily principled politicians; it has to do with the fact 
that certain government had no access to capital markets and thus they had 
to accept close IMF tutelage in the first years, (e.g. Romania, Slovakia). When 
national authorities feel no elbowroom to run high deficit or be soft on inflation, 
they must then sing from IMF’s hymnbook.   
The initial differences do not determine all, but they certainly had strong im-
pact on the policy agenda and ordering of government measures. Let us take 
the case of liberalization and deregulation: countries that had entered the re-
gime change phase with certain prior liberalization already under the previous 
authoritarian regime (Hungary, Yugoslavia) were not forced to take sweeping 
liberalization measures as a first step. Therefore, their economic policy mode 
looked rather gradual in 1990–1991 in this particular respect, while governments 
of former strictly planned regimes (Czechoslovakia, Russia) had to act more 
radically in terms of liberalization. Similarly: a country with sharp macroeconom-
ic imbalances (Poland, Russia) had limited choice but initiate a “frontloaded” 
policy package deliberately in order to shorten the agony of the previous regime 
(Poland, 1990) or to take advantage of the “reform mood” to do what experts 
thought had to be done anyway to avoid looming troubles (Russia, 1991). 
There is another policy area in transition countries with similar dilemmas 
about speed: privatization. It is hard even to imagine a market economy with 
predominant state ownership, hence the policy imperative to privatize state as-
sets. There are, however, numerous economic factors and various social and 
political considerations at play in such a policy issue. One is the competitive 
and financial conditions of state owned enterprises (SOEs) at the moment of 
the political change. If they are in a rather good shape (a rare case, let us admit 
it), it is relatively easy to denationalise them through the capital market, via 
initial public offers (IPOs) to private sector investors, small and large, domestic 
as well as non-resident – provided there is a functioning stock exchange in the 
country. Which was not case in former planned economies, that is. Typically, 
state owned firms were suffering from poor competitiveness positions, were 
obviously overstaffed, lacked modern technology, and its managers were in-
experienced in satisfying customer needs. 
To make the case worse, government agencies did not know much about work-
ing out such firms, and public budget was short of funds to finance turnaround 
(international financial institutions, such as IMF and World Bank, did not at all like 
the concept of government-assisted turnaround of state owned businesses). Under 
such conditions, the state could only try to sell SOEs to selected strategic investors. 
Ironically, bad firms are hard to sell, while in the case of profitable businesses, 
there is less pressure on politicians to sell the good state firms. Even if they de-
cided to de-nationalise a major public corporation, the just selling price is hard to 
determine. Critiques – and there are always critical attitudes to privatisation –  may 
call any sale as squandering of family silver. 
Sell but to whom? What if there are no functioning stock markets? This was the 
case with former communist countries at the start of the regime change. There 
seem to be a Catch-22 situation: it is hard to privatise large scale corporations 
without a liquid and efficient Burse, but newly established (or in CEE: re-estab-
lished) stock exchanges will only vegetate without a proper number of IPO-s and 
stock sales. What thus remains is encouraging risk-taking equity partners, venture 
capitalists, and investment bankers to acquire state assets through acquisition. 
Yet, potential domestic investors tend to be too few at first, therefore decision mak-
ers can only sell assets to cash-rich foreigners. 
Theoretically, authorities may postpone actions until local businesses are strong 
enough and domestic stock exchanges function well – but time was not on the side 
of CEE nations. The strategy of ‘wait and see’ was just not available when West-
ern advisors and international financial institutions were pressurizing governments 
to move boldly, and the government concerned were, in some sense, competing 
against each other for Western attention and interest. Unlike in People’s Repub-
lic of China, where reform processes, started in 1979, took decades and made 
gradual transformation feasible, the European former planned economies did not 
have an option of going slow and taking their time in 1990 and after. 
Some governments badly needed cash to service foreign debt inherited from 
the previous regime, even on the cliff-edge on sovereign default –  this was the 
case of Hungary at the time of the regime change. The government, determined to 
maintain access to financial markets and avoid the chaos a default might trigger, 
was particularly eager to earn hard currency through sale of saleable public assets 
already in the early period of transition.  
Other countries were not that much pressed – for different reasons. The politi-
cally conservative communist leadership that had run Czechoslovakia before the 
Velvet Revolution of 1989, had not borrowed much from Western banks and, con-
sequently did not leave behind significant hard currency debts. The Polish commu-
nists, on the other hand, had had borrowed too much in the hope of accelerating 
the Polish economic growth to such a degree that would guarantee the servicing 
and repayment of the immense bank loans – a pipedream, as it became obvious 
by 1980. People’s Republic of Poland sank into international default (and domestic 
chaos, leading to a state of emergency in 1981). Ironically, the legacy was so heavy 
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that the incoming democratic governments in 1990 had nothing to lose and was in 
a position to apply a hard austerity package internally and bargain about feasible 
conditions of a work-out of its public debts with international lenders under the 
so-called Paris Club of official creditors (concluded in 1991) and London Club of 
private sector creditors (concluded successfully in1993).  
A government not under the pressure to earn hard currency be selling state assets 
could thus afford to distribute state assets among the general public at reduced pric-
es or semi-free (cf. ‘voucher privatization’). Fast privatization versus well-prepared 
sale; market based privatisation versus distribution of assets among the general 
public (the voters…); privatization with no strings attached versus carefully designed 
corporate governance at former SOEs – all serious dilemmas for decision makers. 
     
A short, and pointless, debate on economic policy tempera-
ment: shock therapy or gradual changes
Politicians sometime face a tough dilemma: shall the government ad-
dress all challenges at the same time, or shell it set a sequence for the 
measures.28 There are strong political and ideological arguments for an im-
mediate and all-inclusive reform covering all problem areas: it is thought 
better to act fast and in a determined way, rather than do the job in piece-
meal fashion. Loss of momentum is feared to lead to accumulation of re-
sistance to change, and to waning of political support for reforms. These 
arguments call for a ‘shock therapy’. The other view is ‘gradualist’, with also 
well reasoned arguments: measures need sequencing to work since there 
is a logical order of actions; successful implementation of policy measures 
presupposes the existence of certain institutions, and institution-building 
takes time; time is needed to determine the efficiency of actions taken and 
to correct them based on evidences and feed-back. 
The debate still lingers on in the literature but the reality of the CEE 
countries turned out otherwise. Whether a government meant to ap-
ply shock therapy or wanted instead to avoid unnecessary shocks, the 
economic transformation proved to be shock-like in all cases. Privati-
zation – whatever procedures were chosen by the authorities – were 
surprisingly fast in CEE countries. In a decade, most key industries be-
came privately owned; in most cases, this meant being owned by for-
eigners. Liberalization of factor markets (labour, capital) has been fast, 
with the temporary exception of agricultural land, labour movements 
across national borders and certain services.  
The commonplace view about the countries in transition was – and probably 
is – that the reform-socialist past is an advantage, and the lack of thereof is a 
28 On the pros and cons, see Blejer – Coricelli (1995).
disadvantage. The hypothesis behind such a view is that reformed planned 
economies were probably more prepared for absorbing market economy norms 
and techniques. Or, to put the argument in reverse: closed planned economies 
had had fewer contacts with market economies, and therefore key skills and 
institutions were not available at the start of transition. In short: reformed social-
ism was supposed more suited to absorb the inevitable transition shocks. Yet, a 
quick look at the transition period reveals that reformed or otherwise, all former 
planned economies faced formidable structural, institutional and financial prob-
lems. No country could avoid output collapse, as deep as 16 to 40 per cent off 
the pre-change level, mostly following the patterns of Chart 4/1. 
What made difference must have been something else. The output decline 
was certainly smaller in the CEE region than in the former Soviet Union (Com-
munity of Independent States - CIS). Measured by the change and level of GDP 
per capita, the CEE countries followed a U-shape, while Russia, Ukraine and 
other former Soviet republics (with the notable exception of the Baltic nations 
that gained independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated) rather followed 
the shape of an L: deep decline first, and a longish stagnation after that. 
Chart 4/2
Transformation contraction during the 1990s: U-shape and L-shape 
....and the reality in the first decade
 
Source: Fisher – Sahay (2004). CIS-5: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine; 
CIS-7: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
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What is interesting is that in most cases a second shock wave followed soon 
the initial transition shock of the early 1990s – see the banking crisis of the late 
1990s in the Czech Republic or the slowdown and structural adjustment pains 
in Poland one decade after the initial shock. The particular reasons may be dif-
ferent for each country, but the mere fact underlines that the transformation of 
the economy simply cannot be accomplished with one effort for good. 
Chart 4/3
Economic growth performance in V4 (V3) since the change of system
 
There must have been important external factors of the deep output decline, 
but on top of these, poor functioning of the public sector, that is limited state 
capacity was certainly a component of the transitional contraction.29 A state 
may not fully possess the ability to take the necessary decisions and imple-
ment them effectively. The capabilities of the state machinery are crucial when 
economic policy makers attempt to apply a big doze of reform measures. The 
collapse of the output during the early years of regime change is partly due to 
the mere fact that the “old state” was already incapacitated by the develop-
ments, but the “new state” was still not up and running.
29 „ States vary enormously in their capacities, for many different reasons. The transi-
tion economies are no exception to this general observation. Across the region, one 
can find examples of states with competent, reasonably well functioning and largely 
corruption free administrations, while others lie at the opposite pole - corrupt, inef-
ficient, largely incapable of delivering anything but the simplest of policies.” Paul 
G. Hare (2001): Institutional Change and Economic Performance in the Transition 
Economies. UNECE Spring Seminar
4.4 CEE REGION: FROM EXUBERANCE TO CRISIS – 
OVERDEPENDENCE ON CAPITAL INFLOWS 
Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and other CEE 
economies were not only nations in transit from central planning to market based 
regimes but were also classified as emerging markets. This latter term sets apart 
promising economies from problematic developing countries. Emerging mar-
kets are characterized by improving physical and institutional infrastructure, lib-
eral economic policies, openness to trade and financial flows, strong economic 
growth. The CEE region was like that right after the regime change. 
True, decades of central planning left behind a heavy legacy: obsolete indus-
tries with low energy efficiency, loss making state-owned enterprises accus-
tomed to receiving government subsidies. Some economies (Poland and Hun-
gary in particular) had accumulated deep macroeconomic imbalances in the 
1970s and 1980s, such as inflationary tendencies and external indebtedness. 
On the positive side: a rather educated labour force at low wages, an adequate 
level of technical and scientific sophistication, and other factors of price com-
petitiveness offered great growth opportunities for businesses, making the new 
European democracies an obvious choice for foreign direct investments (FDI) 
at a time of international abundance of liquidity. Pent-up local demand for con-
sumer goods and infrastructure services (housing, banking, insurance, and tel-
ecommunication) was also a factor of the investors’ interest in the region.
Strategic investors did not fail to recognize by the late 1990s that these 
countries were soon to become members of the EU and as such they would 
acquire a European-type legal system, would enjoy relative political stability, 
access to pre-accession grants and later sizeable EU funds and, perhaps most 
importantly, free trade within the EU. For businesses, these are strong incen-
tives to consider investing in the region. 
Eight former planned economies (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) entered the EU in May 2004. 
Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union in January 2007. The new members – 
much less developed than the EU average – were eligible for EU funds that had 
been earlier conceived to ease convergence of the southern member states. 
FDI inflows took off in some “early bird” CEE countries such Hungary and 
the Czech Republic already in the early and mid-1990s.30 After a decade of 
rough transition, at about year 2000, annual net FDI inflows in CEE economies 
became as high as five or more per cent of GDP, particularly in fast growing 
Slovakia, Romania and the three Baltic countries. 
Investors’ decisions were underpinned by improving sovereign ratings granted 
by credit rating agencies. The rating is not a judgement on the country as a 
30 Bod (1998)
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whole; it only forecast the probability of any State (government and the central 
bank) to honour debt obligations without difficulties. Soon after the ending of 
the transition crisis, the Czech Republic received an ‘investment grade’ rating, 
Hungary was below it by two notches, and Slovakia by two more notches – oth-
ers were not able to tap international capital markets by issuing sovereign bonds. 
By 2000, the Visegrad 4 countries and Slovenia had achieved strong investment 
state status while Russia, due to its earlier default on foreign debt in 1998, was in 
a bad shape. The Balkan countries were still seen as risky from rating’s viewpoint.
Table 4/1
Long term rating on foreign currency denominated sovereign debt by 
Standard and Poor’s rating handbooks
Source: Svejnar, 2007
The new EU members seemed to be on a path to long-term convergence to 
the level of advancement of older EU members.  Easy access to foreign funds led 
to an interesting consequence: the current account (CA) constraints to economic 
growth became soft if not suspended altogether. Previously, international financial 
institutions, rating agencies and investment analysts would issue warning signals 
in case CA deficit surpassed a given measure (say, five or more per cent of GDP). 
Domestic policy makers would also feel prompted to change policy course in order 
to bring CA deficit below 5 per cent. This rule of thumb became quickly neglected 
or forgotten in European emerging markets, replaced by a view that if CA deficit 
was mainly financed by FDI and interbank borrowing as well as transfers from the 
EU, then sudden drying up or even reversal of capital inflows is unlikely to happen. 
Unlikely maybe, but high CA deficits and high foreign exchange debt still imply 
refinancing risks. And market mood can change direction. This is exactly what 
happened in 2008 when confidence in less than impeccable counterparties col-
lapsed. After the financial troubles in Iceland in September 2008, Hungary also 
faced difficulties, and had to turn to international financial institutions for funding. 
Soon after that Romania and Latvia (also new EU member states) and Ukraine 
asked for financial support.   
4.5 MEMBERSHIP IN EU – A GAME CHANGER IN 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
It would be logical to assume that the process of preparing to join the EU and 
the membership status itself would be guarantee enough to protect a coun-
try from getting into unsustainable macroeconomic situations. EU accession is 
conditional on attaining a given institutional order, on absorbing, in particular, 
the vast body of EU laws called ‘acquis communautaire’ – a huge volume (over 
80 000 pages if printed) of all legal documents approved and in force since 
the foundation of the club. Interestingly, there were no specific macroeconomic 
criteria determined in addition to the above legal condition. Membership was, 
however, condition on accepting and adhering to principles of liberal democracy. 
The pre-accession negotiation process is long enough to give time for the 
applicant to correct macroeconomic disequilibria and to prove that the coun-
try keeps its legal system and its economy in order. Thus, around entry time, 
economic conditions must be adequate. Once a country is in the EU, there 
are two particular institutions to protect a member state from soaring deficit 
and excessive national debt. One is the Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 
1997; the other is the so-called Maastricht criteria of entry into the eurozone. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a rule-based framework for safeguard-
ing sound public finances in member states – an important requirement for the 
Economic and Monetary Union to function properly and to protect the com-
mon European currency.31 Under the Pact, member states submit annual con-
vergence/stability programs, presenting how governments intend to achieve or 
maintain sound fiscal positions in the medium term. SPG stipulates that national 
annual budget deficits shall not be higher than 3% of GDP, and gross public sec-
tor debt shall not exceed 60% of GDP (or should at least keep approaching the 
reference value), or else the excessive deficit procedure will be triggered. If the 
relevant EU authorities find that the deficit is excessive (breaching the 3% of GDP 
threshold) recommendations are issued to the member state to correct the ex-
cessive deficit, with a set time frame for doing so. Non-compliance with the rec-
ommendations may trigger further steps, including the deliberation of sanctions.
Does that mean that the new member states are safe from running high 
budget deficit and thus from amassing excessive indebtedness? No, most 
new members ran annual deficits higher than 3 per cent of their GDP around 
and after their entry to the EU. As the Greek case showed in 2010, even a 
31 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 
June 1997. Official Journal C 236 , 02/08/1997 P. 0001 - 0002
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member state of the eurozone can drift into near-bankruptcy, although the text 
of the Pact refers to the possibility of sanctions for eurozone countries. The 
regulation is even more opaque on sanctioning a high deficit member state 
outside the eurozone, that is, a country with a currency of its own. 
For a long time, the EU authorities seemed not to be much concerned about 
public sector deficits in new member states. Benign neglect by the EU was 
initially justified inasmuch it should be in the best interest of the new members 
to reduce excessive public sector deficit to avoid crowding out private sector 
investments during their catch-up process. Also new member states intended 
to enter the eurozone, and entry is conditional on meeting a set of quantita-
tive conditions, known as ‘convergence criteria’ or ‘Maastricht criteria’.32 They 
consist of the following macroeconomic indicators:
•	 Relative	price	 stability,	 to	prove	 that	 inflation	 is	 already	under	 control	 in	
the candidate country. Tolerable inflation is determined as consumer price 
index not being more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three 
best performing member states’ value. 
•	 Soundness	and	sustainability	of	public	finances,	through	limits	on	govern-
ment borrowing (not more than 3% of GDP) and national debt (reference 
value: not more than 60% of GDP).
•	 Exchange-rate	stability,	through	participation	in	the	Exchange	Rate	Mech-
anism for at least two years without severe tensions. 
•	 Long-term	 interest	 rates,	 to	 assess	 the	 durability	 of	 the	 convergence	
achieved by fulfilling the other criteria. Long term government bond yields 
shall not be more than 2 percentage points above the rate of the three best 
performing member states in terms of price stability.
A country meeting the above criteria will certainly avoid excessive deficits 
and debts. Governments with a relatively high national debt must find particu-
larly advantageous to enter the euro-club with its low interest rate and good 
sovereign risk rating. In this context ‘old EU’ could logically expect new mem-
ber states to make eurozone entry a national priority, and to conduct policies 
to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. 
Yet, only two out of eight former planned economies entering the EU in 2004 met 
the criteria and joined the eurozone before the 2008 crisis hit them: Slovenia in Jan-
uary 2007 and Slovakia in January 2009 (after having fixed irrevocably the exchange 
rate of the domestic currency some months before the January 2009 change-over 
to euro).  Estonia got the green light in 2010 to join the eurozone, effective of 2011, 
Latvia became member in 2014, and Lithuania in 2015. Other governments of the 
region failed to meet the entry requirements or deliberately remained outside. 
32 Member states agreed upon these criteria in 1991 in the Dutch town of Maastricht as 
part of the preparations for the introduction of the common European currency.
Concept checks
•	 External	shocks	in	the	economy
•	 Managed	(planned)	economy	and	its	legacies
•	 Transition	economy
•	 Regime	change
•	 Sovereign	default
•	 Paris	Club,	London	Club	of	creditors
•	 Shock	therapy	versus	gradual	reforms
•	 Spontaneous	privatization,	mass	de-nationalization,	piecemeal	(transac	
 tional) privatization
•	 U-shape/L-shape/V-shape	transition	crisis
•	 Maastricht	criteria	of	entry	to	eurozone
End-of-chapter questions
Imagine that you are a minister of finance in a transition country responsible 
also for state assets. Would you privatize state-owned firms through a mass 
privatization scheme or on case-by-case basis?
Massive inflow of foreign funds: are they useful or a source of threat for 
emerging markets?
Foreign direct investments: do they increase or narrow the room of manoeu-
vre of national economic policy makers? 
Given that Greece was caught to have falsified official financial data while run-
ning a surprisingly high public sector deficit in 2010, what do you think of the ef-
fectiveness and usefulness of the EU economic policy harmonization framework?
Comment on the pluses and minuses of the common European currency! If 
euro is on the whole a plus for small, trade dependent EU member states, why 
don’t all new members join the Eurozone at the earliest possible date? 
Suppose you are a trade union official. Please comment on the statements of 
J. Sacks concerning the expected labour market consequences of a bold eco-
nomic reform in Poland at the outset of the regime change.   “Unemployment 
rates even above the natural rate (which might be 5% or so) should be expect-
ed—and tolerated—for a few years, as workers move from industry into services 
and construction. Nor should the Polish government be so fearful of layoffs as 
its predecessors were. A growing private sector will absorb workers. “ (Jan 1990)
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5.1 SHOCKS IN ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND IN POLICY 
MAKING
Keeping the economy on track is a hard task for the government even under 
customary economic and social conditions. But how to act when the economy 
is hit by sudden deterioration in external conditions such as a steep increase 
in the price of energy and food? Or when sudden events evolve in domestic 
politics?  We have witnessed several drastic turns – or: shocks in the econom-
ics jargon – in recent decades: oil price revolutions in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the collapse of Communist regimes in Russia and in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, food price explosion, sovereign debt defaults. The most recent case is 
the deep if short-lived global recession and international credit crunch which 
started as ’subprime crisis’ in the US in 2007. 
Recent economic history thus has been rich in shocks, offering cases for 
the students of economic policy making to study the behaviour of consumers, 
savers, politicians, and business decision makers under non-customary con-
ditions. What follows is first, summary of the trends that led to the recent in-
ternational crisis, second, a review of the reaction of policy makers and, third, 
conclusions about the nature of economic decision making under international 
interdependence.
5.2 MOUNTING GLOBAL IMBALANCES LEADING TO 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
A decade of worldwide market expansion came to an end in 2007 when the 
financial turbulences erupted, initially in the US economy. Troubles soon be-
came global by the end of 2008. The sheer size of the fall in exports and con-
traction of national income in a number of economies evoked the memories 
of the Great Crash of the 1930s. Yet, there are important differences between 
these cases, particularly in the behaviour of economic policy makers. We will 
first look at some of the processes that led to the crisis, then at the policy reac-
tions, with special reference to emerging economies.
Both the Great Crash of 1929–1933 and the 2007–2009 global crisis were 
preceded by accumulation of huge macroeconomic imbalances and overop-
timistic sentiments in financial markets. Both originated in the very heart of 
the financial world, the US, and led suddenly to deep recession there and in 
Europe, in otherwise rich economies so dependent on their financial sectors. 
But problems never stop at national borders. In addition to advanced econo-
mies, export-oriented Asian emerging economies were also hit, mostly through 
a temporary decline in demand for their products. Some Latin American and 
African commodity exporters also felt the consequences of the falling demand 
for their main products. CEE economies, countries that had opened up to glo-
bal markets during their transformation process and became capital importers 
in the 1990s, were among those who suffered the most. At the same time, 
economies with huge domestic markets and pro-growth policies like China 
and India did not get into a recession. 
In short, the 2008 recession in the US and Europe developed fast, was (rela-
tively) short-lived but deep, and caused particularly heavy pains to countries that 
had previously became intensively integrated into global structures. This makes 
this crisis case especially formative from economic policy viewpoint. 
The conundrum here is the following: those suffered most that had been diligent 
in following the mainstream policy advice to privatize, liberalize and deregulate. 
This is the case with most emerging markets of CEE: economies that had man-
aged to absorb sizable foreign funds over a decade or two and thus maintained 
fast economic growth rate up until the outbreak of the crisis. Others emerging na-
tions, China first of all, had not followed the economic policy textbook scenario in 
the pre-crisis decades. Instead, they capitalized on domestic savings and cheap 
labour, ran trade surpluses, and built up impressive international reserves as a 
buffer against the volatility of global financial markets. Indirectly they financed the 
current account deficits of other countries, in particular of the US. 
With this lessons in mind, some policy makers in CEE countries wandered 
whether it make sense to act in ’optimum policy’ fashion if the consequences 
are so drastic in bad times? The age-old theme of the ‘decline of the West’ 
reappeared in public discourse, amplified by the impressive growth data, in 
the same period, of the so-called BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
– of which it is only India that is regarded liberal democracy. Soon a shift was 
observed away (temporarily?) from Western values and liberal socio-economic 
practices, and emergence of authoritarian tendencies.33
Certainly, the world changed sudden in or around 2008. The long pre-crisis pe-
riod until 2007 was rather successful in terms of corporate profits and of growth 
statistics in the Western triangle (USA, Western Europe and Japan) but also in a 
dozen emerging economies that had followed the economic liberalization policy 
mainstream. Economic growth resulted in increasing household consumption and 
real wages in emerging economies. But that policy course had a downside: de-
pendence on the judgement of foreign risk takers. ’Irrational exuberance’ among 
investors about the investment prospects in emerging (European and otherwise) 
economies led to accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in selected target 
countries. Now, after the crisis, it looks much clearer: fast economic growth plus 
increased dependence on borrowed funds in emerging markets (first in Asia in 
the 1980s and then in Central Eastern Europe in the since the 1990s until 2008) 
proved to be a potentially explosive combination. 
This was, of course, not the only risky strategy. The policy of consumption-
33 Arch Puddington (2017)
102 PÉTER ÁKOS BOD: ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING
 ECONOMIC POLICY IN CRISIS: A EUROPEAN SURVEY 103
driven growth in core economies (US, first of all) with increased dependence on 
international borrowing also involved huge risks – even if this realization came 
late. The inherent risks eventually materialized in 2007 and 2008 in the very core 
of the world economy, the US. The so-called subprime crisis erupted.34
Soon after that, not too obvious targets were also hit: Iceland, a tiny rich 
European country, and Hungary, a member state of the EU since 2004. Lat-
er came Latvia, Romania, Greece, Ireland, and Ukraine. The banking and fi-
nancial crisis of tiny Iceland may be attributed to banks’ over-lending and to 
gross negligence by the authorities.35 The Hungarian case is more puzzling: 
the country is larger; its economy is closely connected with other emerging 
markets in the region as well as with the core economies of Europe. We will 
look into the Hungarian case in detail, in the context of the policy scene in CEE.
A country case: Hungary requests IMF help
First, let us look at the roots of the later shock. High domestic (forint 
or HUF) interest rate level prompted economic agents, including the gov-
ernment, to borrow in other currencies with lower interest rate. Taking 
out loans in foreign currency (euro, Swiss franc or even yen) became the 
practice in some CEE countries, where the level of domestic interest rates 
remained consistently much higher than interest rates of the mentioned 
currencies. Such a practice, of course, involves running foreign exchange 
risk, and may lead to a certain spontaneous euroization of the economy.36
But why are domestic interest rates so high? One of the typical key 
factors behind high rates is expansionary fiscal policy. This was the case 
34 The subprime mortgage crisis was triggered by a rise in mortgage delinquencies 
and foreclosures in the US when house prices began to decline in 2006-07, and 
financial institutions suffered losses on their mortgage loans made to non-credit-
worthy households. Securities backed with low-quality (subprime) mortgages, 
widely held by financial firms all over the world, lost their value, leading to a de-
cline in the capital of many banks and mortgage firms and, as a consequence of 
near-panic in interbank relations, to drying up of interbank credit around the world. 
See for instance Gary B. Gordon (2008): The Subprime Panic. NBER Working Paper 
Series, w14398, October 2008, pp1-38.; BIS (2008) Quarterly Review, December 
2008, pp 1-93.; ECB (2008): Financial Stability Report. December 2008. pp. 1-44. 
35 The Economist (2008b)
36 Spontaneous, since the legal tender is still the national currency (HUF, zloty, leu) 
but corporations and households tend to use EUR for transactions, as well as to 
place deposits and take out loans denominated in EUR. One should not overlook 
the fact that euro is the common currency of the EU and the governments of the 
mentioned member states, even if they are not members yet of the eurozone, are 
euroized themselves as they contribute to the EU budget and receive funds, and a 
huge amount at that, from the EU budget.
with Hungary: the country ran for a long time high public sector deficits 
financed by domestic and foreign fund holders at rather high Hungar-
ian forint interest rates. Deteriorating national debt figures raised doubts 
among investors after 2005 about the sustainability of the Hungarian eco-
nomic policy. The central bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank – MNB) decided to 
keep policy rates high partly to fight inflationary tendencies, but also to 
counterbalance the occasional nervousness of foreign fund holders. 
High forint interest rate level, in turn, encouraged Hungarian businesses 
and households to borrow in foreign currencies – mostly low interest rate 
Swiss franc and euro. Banks, many of them subsidiaries of foreign finan-
cial groups, did not hesitate much to offer customers loan products (mort-
gages on homes, consumer and car finance loans) denominated in EUR, a 
foreign currency in Hungary. Foreign banks received funding in EUR, CHF 
from the headquarters or through the international interbank market, on 
reasonable terms. As a by-effect of these processes, however, the coun-
try’s overall foreign currency exposure quickly grew out of proportions.
Earlier in the transition process, financial inflows consisted mostly of 
foreign direct investment, and less of bank loans. But with the passage 
of time, FDI turned somewhat away from Hungary as the country lost 
a bit of its shine, and other emerging economies offered better deals. 
Meanwhile, financial and real integration with the EU made it easier for 
domestic firms and banks to borrow internationally.
This is the international context in which Hungary got into trouble in 
October 2008 as one of the first emerging market countries to suffer from 
the indirect consequences of the global credit crunch, and the very first 
EU member state to turn to the IMF for financial support. What makes the 
case far from obvious is that the Hungarian financial sector was not di-
rectly exposed to “toxic assets” that originated in US financial institutions. 
However, as financial difficulties in advanced economies led to global il-
liquidity and to less risk appetite, investors suddenly became concerned 
about high debt emerging markets. In October 2008, investors’ appetite for 
Hungarian bonds evaporated altogether, the national bond issuing agency 
was unable to sell Hungarian securities at all, or only at exorbitant yields. 
Yields on secondary markets shot up, in anticipation of sovereign default.
Another sign of trouble was the sudden depreciation of the domestic 
currency on the money markets. The Hungarian forint nominally freely 
floated; the central bank (MNB) did not set an official exchange rate target. 
Yet, the country had got accustomed to certain exchange rate stability. 
Therefore, the sudden weakening of the Forint came as a very bad surprise 
to indebted families and firms. They together formed a constituency that 
authorities could not neglect. A drastic depreciation of the currency would 
lead to foreclosures, personal distresses, and widespread bankruptcies in 
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small businesses, which in turn could shake the financial system. The for-
eign exchange positions of the banks themselves were broadly balanced 
at that time but the domestic nonfinancial sector carried a high degree of 
exchange rate risk, which could translate into credit risk for banks.
The third factor, forcing the government to ask for help was the spec-
tre of sudden freeze in cross border cooperation in the European finan-
cial sector. It was not sure that West European parent banks (mostly 
Austrians, Germans, Italians) with funding difficulties themselves 
in late 2008 would want or be able to continue channelling funds to 
their CEE subsidiaries. Later it became known that few international 
banks reduced foreign currency credit lines to their off-springs, but at 
first chances were high that cross border flow of funds might become 
scarce and/or more expensive for the country whose banking industry 
happened to be very dependent on external funding.
As a consequence, the immediate outlook for CEE, in general, and for 
high-debt Hungary in particular, changed for the worse. The Hungarian 
government turned to the IMF and the EU for financial support. In No-
vember 2008 the IMF and the World Bank swiftly put together with the 
European Union a 20 billion euro lending facility. This is a surprisingly 
big package for a medium size country with a GDP of 100 billion euro.
The IMF/WB/EU financing was conditional on changes in the Hungarian 
economic policy, in particular a substantial fiscal adjustment, that is less 
public spending and/or more tax. The Hungarian government promised 
the creditors a wage freeze in public sector, cancellation on of a promised 
bonus payment to pensioners (a “13th month of pension”). Previously 
planned tax reductions were to be delayed even if the global deterioration 
of the business climate would have justified a fiscal easing under an anti-
cyclical policy. As a consequence, the Hungarian economy contracted 
heavily and the rate of unemployment increased – that was the price the 
society had to pay for previous mismanagement of the economy.  
5.3 CONCLUSIONS
Sweeping liberalization and opening to the Western socio-economic model 
during the regime change led to the deep penetration of foreign capital into CEE 
economies, increasing productivity, raising the level of financial sophistication 
and financial deepening in CEE. Yet, high dependence on foreign funds and 
export markets backfired at the times of crisis. As a country case of Hungary, a 
former transition champion shows:  large external exposure can turn out to be 
too risky in turbulent times. Most of the blame for this indebtedness should go to 
irresponsible fiscal policies. High stock of government debt, and high net inter-
national borrowing position restrained both fiscal and monetary policy choices 
at time when the crisis hit.
Membership in the EU will not save a member state from getting into grave 
financial problems. EU-wide institutions such as the Stability and Growth Pact 
or the entry conditions into eurozone are just not effective enough to protect 
members from shocks, nor from systematic government mistakes. Once in 
crisis, key member states of the EU may decide to follow their own, narrowly 
defined, national interests. 
Lack of approved crisis management mechanism in the EU at that time opened 
the door for IMF actions when the crisis hit EU countries. The IMF had been search-
ing for its proper role for some time; now it found duties to fulfil. The conditionality 
in the case of Iceland, Hungary, Latvia, Ireland, Greece or with non-EU clients such 
as the Ukraine and Belarus was moulded in the Bretton Woods tradition: fiscal cor-
rection, institutional reforms, strengthening the banking sector, devaluation of the 
currency – this time perhaps without excessive strictness. There were instances 
when the IMF’s attitude was more flexible than that of the European Council as the 
latter was eager to be perceived by capital markets as determined.
Overexposure of an economy to global finance does not just happen; au-
thorities allow it. Governments are always responsible for any excessive de-
pendence on foreign savers. True, global financial markets have been willing 
parties to inundate emerging and converging markets with funds. Abundance 
is easily followed by reversals. Such a correction of temporary overexposure 
may turn out to be very costly in terms of output and employment.
The mere existence of cross border capital flows (and of current account 
imbalances) would not cause such a problem in itself.   Governments of coun-
tries that got badly hit by the fall-outs of the global credit crunch are hardly 
innocent. Hungary, as for one, a trade-dependent country closely related to 
major eurozone economies, should have already fulfilled the euro entry condi-
tions and joined other member states using euro as legal tender. Eurozone 
membership is not a panacea, but the anti-inflationary and anti-debt policy 
that Maastricht test presupposes would have been the very cure for such an 
inflationary and spendthrift state as in the Hungarian case. Better regulation of 
banks and financial corporations so active in mortgage, consumption finance 
and related businesses should have been a priority in countries with potentials 
of asset bubbles or gross misallocation of financial resources. 
Temporary halt of the trade caused a lot of problems in 2009. Policies aiming 
at reducing trade and financial flows across borders would only deepen and pro-
long the crisis: protectionism hurts all actors. It may be tempting for politicians to 
blame other economies for savings too much, thus contributing to access liquid-
ity that provoked irresponsible market behaviour, and blame cheap producers for 
crises in key industrial sectors. Yet, the world has become too interconnected for 
even ’soft protectionism’ to work. Economic policy makers of any given country 
have some room of manoeuvre in important policy fields such as income and so-
cial policy, taxation and public sector management, but rules are increasingly set 
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by the international bodies as well as by global markets with their global players. 
This is why this game is about policy interdependence. It is a pity that protection-
ist instincts always prove to be virulent in hard times, and populist politics would 
always react to the complex situations by offering simple, and faulty, solutions.
 
Concept checks
Consumption-led growth
Export-led growth
Converging economies
Foreign direct investment
Sovereign risk rating
Stability and Growth Pact, Maastricht criteria as EU frameworks
Foreign debt exposure
Exchange rate risk
Dollarization (euroization)
End-of-chapter questions
Easy come, easy go?” Discuss the nature of cross-country capital flows from 
emerging countries’ viewpoint.
Converging markets of Central and Eastern Europe – are they really different 
from emerging markets like Turkey, India or South Africa?
Foreign banks’ penetration into emerging and converging markets has been high 
in recent years. Does that guarantee a steady inflow of funds to these markets?
„Common European currency is an answer to many economic problems of CEE 
countries.” Why, then, are so many late in entering the euro-club?
What is wrong with borrowing in currency of others if interest rates are lower 
elsewhere?    
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6.1 WHEN INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE DOES 
NOT WORK EFFICIENTLY 
The eruption of what most people call global financial crisis in 2008 triggered 
off major changes both in particular economic policy courses and in the com-
monly held views about the definition of good economic policy and good gov-
ernment. The crisis is generally called global but, in fact, it was a set of advanced 
(core) countries and their dependencies that suffered the most during the tur-
moil. The global core powers (the United States, the EU, and Japan) were the 
first to resort to crisis mitigating measures. The measures included the age-old 
Keynesian advice on how to soften and counterbalance economic downturn, 
but some governments applied non-conventional policy solutions as well. 
Keynes and Keynesianism on stabilization
 It was John Maynard Keynes, a British economist and renowned 
public figure, who rejected the then mainstream in the 1930s, and gave 
a new direction to economic thought. The „Classics” had claimed be-
fore him that the forces of supply and demand of the market economy 
would lead eventually to equilibrium in product markets through free 
movement of prices. They had also posited that incidents of high unem-
ployment can be cured by wage cuts. Keynes refuted these thoughts 
in his influential book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money published in 1936, soon after the devastating Great Depression. 
He attributed the slump to the collapse of overall demand, especially 
of private investment; his policy prescription was the exact opposite of 
the previous mainstream. Keynes and his followers argued that, as ag-
gregate demand is unstable and frequently inadequate, a market econ-
omy would often underperform. Slumps, with high unemployment, can 
be mitigated by active policy measures: in the downturn phase of the 
business cycle, the central bank should reduce its policy rates in order 
to encourage investment activities, and fiscal policy should be expan-
sionary to support output by maintaining adequate aggregate demand. 
Keynesian economists advocate an active role for government during 
recessions – and some even after recessions.
Keynes’s thought quickly became standard economics after the Sec-
ond World War.  Massive government expenditures helped war-stricken 
economies recover fast. It looked that Keynesianism worked. Keyne-
sian views soon dominated the economics profession. Politicians were 
eager to embrace the new mainstream, and to spend generously on 
investments, welfare, and other popular causes. 
Side effects, however, appeared soon: increasing government debt 
or higher tax burden. The money that the government spends must 
come from somewhere: from borrowing or from other actors. If stimu-
lus plans are funded by issuing more government debt, growing public 
sector debt absorbs savings that might otherwise go to private invest-
ment. Critics of Keynes claimed that public spending could not lead to 
sustained recovery, because its stimulating effect would be offset by 
the need to finance the deficit. Rational investors and business players 
would anticipate higher taxes under a high spending policy regime, and 
would as a consequence invest less than the authorities had thought. 
Keynesianism lost its appeal in the 1970s since it had no cure for the 
new problem of the period: the twin challenge of high inflation and low 
output. When monetary and fiscal authorities wanted to mitigate the 
recession by pumping more money into the economy, inflation acceler-
ated intolerably; if, instead, they followed a stricter fiscal policy stance, 
recession became even deeper. The worst, as Britain experienced in 
the 1970s, is the stop-go politics: an expansionary policy period fol-
lowed by austerity to restore external balance, but again growing un-
employment forced government to apply expansionary measures. 
After the fall from grace of Keynesianism, more efforts were paid to 
understand the production process of the economy (supply side eco-
nomics), and policy makers turned their attention to ways of increasing 
the flexibility and structural adjustment capability of the economy. Mon-
etarism also emerged as another powerful stream of a thought claim-
ing that keeping the value of money (currency) stable is the best that 
economic policy can do to the economy. 
The advent of the financial crisis in 2008 led to a resurgence in Key-
nesian and neo-Keynesian thought. This is not surprising: in times of 
deep output contraction it does not seem to be good politics just to 
wait until the market forces somehow solve the problem – on the long 
run. Keynes famously said that “on the long run we are all in the grave”. 
In politics, months may feel like the long run. 
The less advanced but influential big countries of the so-called BRICS group 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) initially seemed to be rather un-
affected by the ‘global’ downturn. Their policy reactions, at first, were also 
restrained, although China, for instance, did immediately apply Keynesian 
demand-enhancing measures in order to underpin its traditionally high growth 
rate. Other emerging markets that had previously suffered hardships because 
of their excessively fast and thus unbalanced economic growth (South Korea, 
Thailand, Mexico), had learnt the lessons in the hard way, thus they decided 
to take a conservative, cautious policy course during the crisis. Their govern-
ments and central banks piled up high international reserves and were care-
ful to keep macroeconomic balances under control as an insurance against 
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sudden shocks. They certainly did not imitate the activist crisis management 
mode of the advanced countries.
Yet, all economies are interdependent to various degrees today. This means 
that every single nation experienced a new situation after 2008. All over the 
globe, economic policy making took a new direction after the collapse of lead-
ing US investment bank Lehman Brothers. Consequently, best practice in pol-
icy making had to be redefined.   
The crisis erupted in the core, but took its heaviest toll in the periphery. Let 
us take again the case of Hungary, an open economy, being part of the Euro-
pean Union, albeit on its periphery. 
Hungary case: Take 2
Hungarian output suffered a deeper decline in 2008–2009 than the 
European average. The Hungarian state, in fact, avoided sovereign de-
fault only by turning to the International Monetary Fund and the Europe-
an Union for financial support. Support was soon granted, but the gov-
ernment (a Socialist and Liberal coalition) had to accept, of course, the 
strings attached to a stand-by loan. The loan conditions were serious, 
as always, but not excessively hard: the authorities had to promise to 
keep budget under control, strengthen banking supervision, take steps 
to make labour market more flexible. Still, these were hard times for the 
region, and particularly for Hungary with its huge public sector debt and 
external country debt accumulated during a short period between 2001 
and 2007. For lack of any fiscal room, the Hungarian government was 
simply not in a position in 2009 to support aggregate demand through 
further government spending in good Keynesian manner, unlike some 
other CEE states that happened to be in better financial situation and 
free from IMF tutelage. Consequently, the Hungarian recession turned 
out to be particularly serious; yet the government just could not apply 
countercyclical measures to mitigate the contraction. Thus in the years 
of 2008–2010, Hungarian economic policy making went, willy-nilly, 
against the Keynesian demand-management course. 
With these antecedents, the political forces that came to power in 
Hungary in year 2010, with Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister, defined em-
phatically their policy course as a full rejection of previous practices. 
They even applied to themselves, and thus knowingly accepted, the 
term ’unorthodox’, however hard it is to define the meaning of Euro-
pean orthodoxy, since those very years exemplified the wide variety of 
policy reactions to crisis among European nations. Moreover, policies 
had not been homogeneous even in the previous period. The Hungar-
ian policy course took gradually interventionist directions, provoking 
clashes with EU institutions. The government concluded that the West 
(and particularly the EU) would be stuck in the slow lane, and it is thus 
advantageous for the country to turn to the more dynamic (at least, it 
looked like at that time) East: hence the ‘Opening to the East’ initiative 
to do more business with Russia, China, Turkey. Such policy turn has 
its price: massive government centralization, removal of checks and 
balances, and anti-Western and autocratic rhetoric - these tenets of its 
policy put the Hungarian government to serious criticism from EU insti-
tutions and certain member states within the European Union.  
6.2 LESSONS TO LEARN
Ample time has passed since 2008 for us to digest the changes in econom-
ic thinking and in policy-making. A systematic summary, however, would be 
hard to arrive at, as the original financial crisis and its concomitant recession 
(in certain countries: economic slowdown) did end by year 2010, but some 
countries suffered a secondary recession soon after. In addition, the economic 
scene and the policies applied differ tremendously across nations, even within 
a theoretically closely knit community of states, such as the European Union, 
cemented by a common legal body, similar values, and intensive intergovern-
mental cooperation.   
There are certain general lessons learnt, though. The first: national policy-
making is activated when the fluctuations of economic output much exceed 
those of a customary business cycle, and in particular when the economy falls 
into deep recession with all the negative social consequences.  The deeper the 
recession, the more marked will be the country-specific character of response.
This is a natural course of events, although a government may theoretically 
choose two other directions. The first: a laissez-faire attitude by letting the 
economy to work out the shock of the recession on its own. Or alternatively, 
governments may initiate a coordinated international (European) policy re-
sponse to the crisis (“European Semester”). 
As for the first option, the recession just turned out to be too deep for that. 
Take the otherwise strong German economy: it contracted by 4 per cent dur-
ing year 2009. That would call for remedy actions, particularly as it was the 
government regulated financial sector where the problems had culminated. 
Thus even pro-market, conservative governments decided that immediately 
intervention was justified. 
Concerning the second (more concentrated European) response, the geo-
political conditions were just not supportive enough. The European Union had 
by that time become rather heterogeneous through successive enlargements, 
and the financial crises revealed various splits within it: North versus South, 
Core versus Periphery, old members versus new members. 
For a global framework, international groupings of major advanced markets 
(G7 and G8) had proved to be too narrow; this is why G20 emerged as an in-
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ternational forum of significance. But it just could not become an effective co-
ordinating body due to the divergent value systems and national interests, and 
to the widely different socio-economic systems of its constituting members.
At the same time, international financial institution, the IMF in particular, 
came forward again. Today it may sound strange that the usefulness of the IMF 
had been publicly questioned and debated in pre-crisis years, and some had 
advised to turn (downgrade) the Fund into a sort of consultative forum. Than 
the crisis struck. In the summer of 2008, after long years of global financial 
peace, the prospect of tiny Iceland’ sovereign default eventually gave a job for 
the IMF. Then came Hungary’s request for a stand-by loan in October 2008: 
IMF’s swift reply and the quite large size of the Fund’s share of the bail-out 
package (ten times of Hungary’s IMF quota) was meant to convince financial 
markets that there would be no domino effect in the region. The IMF became 
the leading force in mitigating the damages caused by the sudden stop of 
financial flows. Its activity became crucial particularly for countries on the EU’s 
periphery (Ireland, Portugal, Greece), in the Baltic area and on the Balkan.   
It is noteworthy that the economic philosophy expressed by the Fund’s office 
holders and their positions taken in international forums very much differ now 
from the orthodoxy of the 1980s, the so-called Washington consensus. This term 
was applied for the ’ten commandments’ that is a set of ’common wisdom’ that 
any government official of a borrower nation heard when visiting the IMF, World 
Bank, the US government, and think tanks in Washington DC in the 1980s. The 
stock advice consisted of the following: 1) Fiscal policy discipline, with avoid-
ance of large fiscal deficits relative to GDP; 2)  Ordering of public spending items, 
reduction of subsidies; 3)Tax reform: broadened tax base with low marginal tax 
rates; 4) Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) 
in real terms; 5) Competitive exchange rates (devaluation) 6) Trade liberalization: 
liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative 
restrictions; 7) Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 8) Privatization 
of state enterprises; 9) Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market 
entry or restrict competition. 10) Legal security for property rights.
It may have been the policy mainstream – but not anymore. At present, advo-
cates of financial austerity in Europe and in the United States clash with the pro-
ponents of continued public sector spending to increase aggregate demand. The 
IMF does not come down automatically on the austerity side as you might guess 
knowing of the Fund’s previous views. The IMF’s research documents and policy 
papers do not recommend a return to the previous behaviour rules and to the sta-
tus quo; rather they envisage a “new normal”. Sustainability, in financial as well 
as in broader sense, plays a more important role in this proposed new normal. 
One of the new components of the post-crisis macroeconomic mixture is the 
enhanced economic policy role of the central banks (CB). The balance sheets of 
leading CBs, such as the Bank of Japan, the FED, and later the European Central 
Bank, have grown significantly in recent years. What has changed is not only the 
size of activity but also CB mode of functioning. Some call is a new and non-
customary attitude but, in fact, central banks have returned to previous prac-
tices: several of them have increased dramatically their stock of government debt 
securities or have provided – directly or via intermediaries – funds for business 
agents. Both activities were regarded standard one hundred years ago. 
Let us note, however, that direct CB financing of the budget is still forbidden; 
the protection of value of fiat money (one without being backed by gold) and 
fight against inflationary tendencies remain the main responsibility of any cen-
tral bank. The reason why this fundamental responsibility was less pronounced 
for years after 2008 is that inflationary pressures weakened or disappeared 
altogether both in the developing and in the advanced world in those years. 
The global decline of commodity and food prices after year 2012 led to disin-
flationary consequences, leaving thus less anti-inflationary tasks for the CBs. 
They therefore could direct their resources into the fight against the decline 
and volatility of output, as well as safeguarding the financial system under the 
so-called macro-prudential policy.  
Another warning is in place here: CB ‘unorthodoxy’ nowhere implies the re-
jection of the classical principles of central banking. Quantitative and/or quali-
tative easing (QQE) is a rational reaction, and a temporary one, to a given situ-
ation: central banks do not only use their interest rate instruments in order to 
support commercial lending activity but they also try to inject liquidity in the 
form of cheap loans granted to business entities directly. In sustained episodes 
of continuous shrinking of the balance sheets of banks and non-financial cor-
porations, with households reluctant to return to the loan markets, and with no 
clear sign of business cycle take off, monetary policy can afford to resort to 
non-conventional measures without unleashing the spectre of inflation. 
But monetary easing shall not go on forever. Until 2018, central bankers had not 
forced to concentrate on the headline inflation index (CPI), for temporary reasons. 
But inflation is not dead even if for structural reasons (ageing, technological trends, 
market structure) the dynamics of price (and wage) increases are very different 
from part tendencies. Also, they must care about further increase of asset prices. 
Another asset price bubble remains a possibility, therefore a responsible central 
bank must exit in time from the expansionary monetary policy course applied in 
order to underpin economic growth. Similarly, a responsible central banker shall 
not forget about the time-honoured principles forbidding the CB to run commercial 
risk: risk-taking is best left for profit-driven financial corporations and banks. 
A bit more complex issue is state ownership under the new normal. Before 
the crisis, the norm was that the State, as a rule, shall not be a producer of 
products and services but shall leave business activities to private sector, and 
should rather privatize state-owned firms. Then came the crisis, and with it 
some states decided to intervene and acquire ownership in banks, insurance 
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companies, even industrial and construction groups – big businesses whose 
bankruptcy might carry systemic risk. 
Nationalisation, that is the state or the CB acquiring stake in private ventures, 
goes against the previous intellectual mainstream. Numerous cases of nation-
alisation transactions in advanced countries these days do indicate that acqui-
sition by public agents is mostly a transitory measure, followed by privatisation 
as soon as business gets normal, and state aid shall be regained. Rescue loans 
have been paid back to the Treasury in the United States, and episodes of na-
tionalisation are being followed by privatisation. With the US back on a growth 
path, federal intervention expenditures paid during the years following 2007 
have since orderly recovered. Europe is a bit different. Country cases, to start 
with, differ: in some countries, public funds were used to bail out banks, and 
bank taxes were introduced to recover the costs (from UK to Slovenia), while in 
other countries (among them in Hungary) the banking sector did not have to be 
bailed out. The European business cycle has not been as strong as in the US, 
and thus the banking equities that some governments were forced to acquire 
have turned out to be more difficult to re-sell to private investors. But both in 
Europe and in the US the authorities have regarded acquisition as a crisis man-
agement tool and, consequently, a temporary measure.
Temporary measures may last long, though, particularly when the underlying 
problem is difficult to solve. Still, nationalising large scale financial institutions 
that may represent a systemic risk (“too-big-to-fail”), or keeping such entities 
in the public sector for a long time, does not make much sense. Banking su-
pervision in national level, or as in Europe: in supranational level, is a mighty 
instrument that can well replace direct involvement in entities of strategic size. 
Long-term public sector ownership would only undermine the efficiency and 
impartiality of banking regulation. 
6.3 A NEW NORMAL SOON? AND ONLY A SINGLE 
ONE?
National economic policy courses diverge in crisis times; but once the shock 
waves gradually settle, the factors that had led to an emergence and spread of 
accepted practices in previous periods, reappear as drivers for a new consensus. 
This does not mean that particular national practices wane away. Still, interde-
pendence is typical of economic processes, but also of economic policy practice: 
governments exert influence on others and are influenced by the practice of others.
It is hard to claim that hard times are over as the world economy mostly di-
gested the shocks of the 2007 – 2010 crisis. Economic life is always capable of 
surprises. Core nations returned to growth soon after this crisis, and the US, the 
EU had a nearly decade-long upswing in the business cycle. Yet, particular risk 
factors appeared. Such were the slowdown in the real economic growth rate 
of the People’s Republic of China, and the drastic downward price correction 
in Chinese stock exchanges; the fall in global crude oil prices and the parallel 
contraction of revenues in oil exporting countries; the exit from the expansionary 
policy mode of major CBs and its potential consequences on global monetary 
conditions. The outcome of the British referendum on EU membership shook 
the policy scene in 2016, as well as the election of Mr Trump, with protectionist 
views, as US president. The migrant crisis of 2015 tested the solidarity of Euro-
pean countries, and fuelled populist and illiberal tendencies in several countries. 
Disruptive technologies spread, and they do put several sectors to survival test. 
Still, it is reasonable to assume that whatever economic disturbances and 
market volatilities may come, they will not reach depths comparable to those 
that took place between 2008 and 2010, and may not hit the same regions and 
economies. The so-called BRICS group, star performers only a decade ago, 
later faced economic growth problems (perhaps with the exception of India), 
while the advanced countries of global core (US, Japan, and Western Europe) 
reported improved growth performance soon after the crisis. As a consequence, 
the norms, practices, and approved procedures within the international finan-
cial and economic institutions (IMF, OECD, BIS, WTO) and in intergovernmental 
cooperation may again move towards some harmonisation trends.
Table 6/1
Growth of output in major economies and regionsper cent changes,
year on year
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2019
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The pattern of global growth is not going to change drastically according 
to IMF forecasters: core countries keep growing albeit at somewhat slower 
pace, and most emerging regions also (a dip in Latin America in the end of the 
decade is due to structural problems is Brazil, a slowdown in emerging and 
developing Europe is caused by the Turkish recession in 2018-2019).  Devel-
oping Asia and Africa perform well. As for countries in European periphery, 
the earlier crisis and the years that followed 2008 revealed dramatically the 
schisms in the “ever closer union”. North Europe, middle Europe (including 
the German, Dutch, and Polish economy), and South-Europe have all followed 
very different economic paths after 2007. Eventually, the crisis has petered 
out, and recovery has become widespread and, as growth become stronger 
by the years - until another slowdown sets in.
Overall growth does not mean that stark differences within closely linked 
markets disappear even on the longer term. What is noteworthy is the high 
variance in labour costs (and take home wages) in various member states of 
the EU. Under free movement of labour, such significant variation of cost of 
employment has obvious impact on, first, allocation of labour intensive activi-
ties in the Continent (outsourcing to lower wage cost areas) and /or migration 
of people to higher wage economies.
Table 6/2
Estimated hourly wages cost in the EU, 2017
Source: Eurostat
Wages are determined by numerous factors: labour productivity, structure of 
the given economy, shape of business cycle, demographic conditions, taxation 
regimes and pension systems, and – in case various currencies are in use – by 
the value of a particular national currency. Still, for the general public such fac-
tors and economic theories explaining intertemporal and international wage dif-
ferences sound too abstract. Those living in high wage countries feel threatened 
by cheap labour that seems to keep flowing in unstoppably from poor member 
states. The general public of the latter countries may feel at the same time disil-
lusioned by the yawning gap between what ‘we’ earn against what ‘they’ earn.
Wage and income tensions within a group of nations might be mitigated 
by the prospect of speedy catch-up – one may think that perceptible conver-
gence of income levels among interconnected nations will slow down eco-
nomic migration. But economic history does not support high hopes of fast 
convergence: differences in advancement (and income, wealth) level do not 
disappear easily, if at all. Even extremely successful cases of convergence 
have taken two to three generations: East Asian ‘Tigers’ (Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan) managed to leave their ’underdeveloped’ position and gain 
’developed’ status in the course of two generations. In Europe: Sweden, Fin-
land, Ireland also climbed up on the development ladder relatively fast – but 
fast by economic historian’s terms and not by the rational expectation of the 
educated youth living in a new member state of the EU or in any country in the 
vicinity of richer neighbours. The time horizon of an upwardly mobile young 
specialist in search of a better life is set in years but not in decades or genera-
tions – hence the obvious decision to consider moving to higher income (and 
typically safer, more democratic) society, offering more choices. 
There certainly was relatively fast convergence to EU level before the 2008 
crisis, but the process of catch-up slowed down, and even came to a halt in 
some country cases. On the whole, convergence outlook turned dim for some 
time after the crisis. Then dynamism returned to the semi-periphery of Europe 
(maybe, the term itself will be totally forgotten). Still, political tensions did not 
evaporate. Popular support for Western values and institutions suffered a de-
cline after the years of turbulences. Some governments had a try with new 
solutions, or more frequently with old tricks, such as centralization of decision-
making power and renationalization of key sectors. 
It is hard to foresee what forms the contradictions within Europe will take. 
But given that countries and their governments have a huge stake in the suc-
cess of the common European currency and of the policies supporting euro 
and the uninterrupted flow of goods and funds, the core will most probably 
decide to move forward energetically. Repeated instances of undisciplined and 
irresponsible attitudes to European fiscal rules and principles obviously caused 
damages to the European cause; think of the former practice of tinkering with 
the Maastricht tests data or the way the Stability and Growth Pact was (not) ap-
plied rigorously to Eurozone states in 2005.  Let us face it: many of the present 
problems were caused by repeated neglect of the EU’s own ground rules. 
This is why it is logical of the core of the EU to move towards a stricter com-
pliance of the existing rules, as well as towards drafting and enforcing new rules 
of convergence. A country that will be not able to meet the new norms, or its 
government refuses to comply with them, may fall from the inner sphere of the 
EU (even if not from the EU itself) – with all the consequences and risks emanat-
ing from such an event.   
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Part of the causes of divergent economic performances and policies is the 
lack of uniformity in values. Let us take the issue of integrity of the civil service 
and of the whole society: you may expect that liberal democracy uproots cor-
ruption or keeps it at a tolerable level. Yes, historical trajectories differ, but mem-
bership in a community of states built on common values and interests should 
logically help nations become similar to each other. Still, this is not the case. A 
look at the perceived level of corruption (a widely measure with good descrip-
tive value) reveals that European nations still differ a lot in their acceptance of 
corrupt practices. Italy, Greece and some (but not all!) new member states stand 
out as relatively exposed to corruption, while the North European nations and 
certain Western and Central Europeans are much less prone to corruption. 
6.4. MEASURES ALWAYS WORK SLIGHTLY 
DIFFERENT IN EUROPEAN PERIPHERY
Taking into account the above, one can identify the following pillars of po-
tential economic policy guidelines for the coming years for open economies on 
the fringes of Europe. 
If a country is not ready or not motivated to enter the eurozone, it is well ad-
vised to apply a soft peg to euro as an anchor currency or, what is close to that, 
enter the ERM2. A free float of the currency may, in the future, entail an even 
larger volatility of the exchange rate – a big risk at such high trade openness 
level and a handicap in international competitiveness. Reduction of external 
debt, decrease of foreign exchange share in financing the budget represents a 
welcome policy direction; the reduced foreign exposure is an achievement in 
itself but it should not justify a move away from entry into the eurozone.
The increased activity of national economic policy makers, a common fea-
ture of the post-crisis period, has enlarged the country-by-country differences 
in terms of business regulations and in applying international conventions and 
rules. Certain governments have even introduced stricter regulations in order 
to protect national markets. International organizations have registered an in-
crease of the incidents of protectionist measures since the eruption of the 
crisis. True, some harshly worded political declarations (“We will make firms 
bring home production activities that were outsourced abroad”) have mostly 
remained ineffective: competitive pressures on the very firms have demanded 
further outsourcing to low-cost areas. Yet, the increase of the wage level in 
Asia and the recalculation of the long distance supply chain risks have made 
many West European firms re-shore activities – but not bring them back to high 
wage cost domestic locations but to European periphery.   
This process has been quite advantageous for Central-Eastern Europe, par-
ticularly for Poland, Slovakia, and Romania in recent years. However, certain 
governments take controversial policy measures with regard to international 
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companies (verbal and even actual tax discrimination in the service sector, 
particularly in banking, on the one hand, while generous subsidies to manufac-
turing industry or to friendly firms, on the other). Such policies will reduce the 
chances in the medium term of the given country’s participation in the supply 
chain reconfiguration by West European firms. Disadvantaged foreign compa-
nies may choose to react passively by holding back their investment activities 
in CEE countries and getting ready to leave the market once their original in-
vestments have been amortized, but they also may look for judicial remedies. 
International negotiations underway in order to re-regulate commercial prac-
tices (such as TTIP) may not get too far but their mere existence reveals the 
international determination to streamline the controversial trading practices: 
cleaner business norms probably will be part of the ’new normal’. Small and 
open economies can only contradict these emerging rules at their own peril.     
Concept checks
too-big-to fail enterprises and banks
quantitative easing
BRICS
PIGS
quasi fiscal activity of central banks
policy orthodoxy, heterodox policies
Washington consensus
Crony capitalism
integrity, corruption and its measurement
End-of-chapter questions
Discuss the reasoning for, and risks of, nationalisation of banks in a periph-
ery country.
Will and should increased unemployment in core countries make govern-
ments to take measures against further outsourcing of activities to lower wage 
economies? Argue. 
Reactivation of national policies in crisis times is common. Will recent cases 
lead to an end (or a slowdown) of the process of global financial and trade 
openness? Argue. 
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